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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS INTRODUCTION 
COCA The Care of Chilclren Act 2004 (NZ) The participation of children and minors in genetic testing raises issues concerning the 
The Code Cocle of Health and Disability Services Consumers' 
Rights Regulation 1996 (NZ) 
limits and extent of parental authority and the rights of children and minors involved. 
The CRC The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Genetic testing, as a form of health care (be it considered a treatment or a procedure), 
Child 1989 
The Charter The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
comes under the umbrella of n1edical law. Medical law has been described as a "subset of 
Union 2000 human rights law",1 a view which is adopted in other scholarship.2 In this way, medical 
The Child Convention The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989 law can be informed by (international) human rights law, which prioritises the self-
The ECECR The European Convention on the Exercise of Children's 
Rights 1996 
determination and dignity of the patient.3 Underlying self-determination and dignity is 
The ECHR The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and autonomy which is a common thread throughout this paper. The concept of choice, 
The European Convention on Human Rights Fundamental Freedoms 1950 present and future, is at the heart of all issues concerning genetic testing. Informed 
The Genetic Testing Protocol The Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention 
concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (opened consent is the medical expression of personal autonomy and choice. The issue of consent 
for signature 27 November 2008) (not yet entered into 
force) 
is particularly thorny with children. One must ask who has the capacity to decide? Who 
The HADCA The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 has the right or responsibility to decide? What role do children's rights have to play in 
The Health Practitioners Act Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 health care decision making? Does the type of disease being tested for change the 
The HGRP The Human Genome Research Project 
The NZBORA· The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
analysis? What are the health practitioner's obligations? Do third parties have the right to 
The Oviedo Convention The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and know about genetic information gleaned from family members which may impact on 
Dignity of the Human Being with regarcJs to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
them? The questions are many and not exclusively legal. They also demand a 
Human Rights and Biomedicine 
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human The UDBHR 
consideration of bioethical, medical, social and psychological issues. This paper does not 
Rights 2005 purport to answer all of these questions. Possible answers to many have already been 
The UDHGHR The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights 1997 
The UDHR The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
1 I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law (3rd edn Butterworths, London 2000) 3. 
2 E Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007). 
3 1bid 2. 
furnished in New Zealand within the second volume of the Reports submitted by the 
Human Genome Research Project ("HGRP").4 
Indeed, the motivation for this paper arose out of the work that has already been 
undertaken by the HGRP in New Zealand and stems from one particular suggestion of 
theirs: that the scope of the power of parental consent to genetic testing of their children 
should be limited to testing where it is to the child's benefit, rather than in the child's best 
interests. The recommendation purports to a collapse a hitherto multi-faceted best interests 
approach into a single "benefit" test. As w·ill be discussed, where the parent has the 
authority to consent, such consent is currently limited to interventions in the child's best 
interests. The HGRP argues that the best interests standard is too open to manipulation and 
justifies the taking into account of factors which do not actually pertain to the child's best 
interests. Moreover, the child's best interests will only be objectively assessed by a court if 
the court is asked to intervene for a particular reason. 
This recommendation was made without any emphasis on international law or the 
principles that can be gleaned from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. This thesis aims to re-examine the issue against this broader international and 
European background, with an emphasis on the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child,s the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
4 Human Genome Research Project, 'Genes, Society and the Future: Volume 11: The Genetic Testing of 
Children' (Dunedin 2007). 
s United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 15!7 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) ("The Child Convention" or "The CRC"). --The Child 
Convention has been ratified by all UN member states (on hundred and ninety three parties) except for 
Somalia and the United States. 
2 
Freedoms, 6 the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regards to the Application of Biology and Medicine and its Genetic Testing 
ProtocoV and the fundamental principle of human dignity of the child. 
This thesis focuses on the genetic testing of individuals as distinct from the genetic 
screening of populations. lt will not focus on the genetic testing issues relating to pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis, prenatal testing (of foetuses or embryos) or newborn 
screening. Such issues have a tendency to engage a highly charged moral and religious 
debate which this paper deliberately seeks to avoid.8 Similarly, the testing of intellectually 
disabled children has not been the focus of research but analogues will undoubtedly 
emerge from this paper's examination of a child simpliciter's competence to consent and 
the legal consequences which pertain thereto. 
Certain expressions used herein need to be defined. The expressions child/children, minor 
and young person/people will be used in this paper to refer to any person under the age of 
18, in accordance with the definition contained in the CRC and in the Care of Children Act 
2004.9 To a lesser extent, this paper will use the expressions newborn, baby and infant to 
6 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature on 4 
N.ovember 1950 (entered into force 3 November 1953) ETS No. 005 ("The European Convention on Human 
R1ghts" or "the ECHR"). 
7 C~nv~ntion f~r the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regards to the 
Appl1cat1on of B1ology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (entered into force 1 
D_ecember 1999) ETS No. 164 ("The Oviedo Convention"); Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human 
R1ghts and Biomedicine concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (opened for signature on 27 
~ovember 2008) ETS No. 203 ("Genetic Testing Protocol"). The Genetic Testing Protocol is of particular 
~mportance .and can perhaps provide some guidance for what is to happen in New Zealand, most 
Importantly m terms of regulatory considerations. 
;~~ Schwartz, Heredity and Hope: the Case for Genetic Screening (Harvard University Press, London 2008) 
9 Care of Children Act 2004 ("COCA''). 
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describe extremely vulnerable children and the very young; generally speaking a newborn 
child is between one to four weeks old. Though "infant" is also employed as a legal term 
equivalent to "minor", this paper has deliberately avoided the use of the term in this 
manner. To do so would disconnect the expression from society's use of the term; that is, 
referring to a baby.10 
The expression "health practitioner" is any person who is, or is deemed to be, registered 
with an authority as a practitioner of a particular health profession.11 At present, the 
following practices are legally recognised health professions: chiropractic, dietetics, 
medical radiation technology, medicine, medical laboratory science, nursing, occupational 
therapy, physiotherapy, podiatry, psychology and psychotherapy.12 This paper will employ 
the expressions health practitioner/professional to denote any professional registered in 
New Zealand in compliance with the Health Practitioners Act who is involved in the 
genetic testing process and thereby owes duties and obligations towards the child patient 
and/or the child's guardians and/or affected third parties arising out of that genetic test. In 
practice, the practitioners involved in genetic testing will be the child's doctor (or GP), a 
specialist clinical geneticist (accessed through clinical genetics services) and the genetic 
counsellor. The latter need not necessarily be a third party but could also be, for example, 
the GP fulfilling a counselling role. Clinical genetics is the medical speciality which 
10 As a matter of etymology, "infant" derives from the Latin expression in fans meaning unable to speak. 
11 Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 ("Health Practitioners Act"), s 5(1 ). 
12 All of these professions are set out in Schedule 2 of the Health Practitioners Act. The latter profession, 
psychotherapy, was added as a health profession by the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance 
(Designation of Psychotherapy Services as Health Profession) Order 2007. 
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"provides a diagnostic service and genetic counselling for individuals and families with, or 
at risk o( conditions which may have a genetic basis".n 
Guardian (and guardianship) will be used within the meaning of the definition in s 15 of 
the COCA to mean that person who has, in relation to the child: 
(a) all duties, powers, rights and responsibilities that a parent of the child has in 
relation to the upbringing of the child; 
(b) every duty, power, right, and r~sponsibility that is vested in the guardian of a 
child by any enactment; . 
(c) every duty, power, right, and responsibility that, immediately before the 
~ommenceme~t, on 1 January 1970, of the Guardianship Act 1968, was vested 
111 a sole guard1an of a child by an enactment or rule of law. 
In general terms, the expression guardian or parent (deemed to be a guardian pursuant to s 
1 7 of the COCA) is used to refer to that person who has the authority to act on behalf of 
the child. 
My general methodology was to take an international and European perspective on the 
issue of best interests versus benefit, one which could then be applied to the question in 
New Zealand. The dignity of the child was employed to anchor the debate and inquire 
which test, in light of any distinctions, dignity would favour. 
No meaningful discussion could ensue without an understanding of genetic testing. The 
first section therefore begins with an outline of the genetic testing process and highlights 
the common distinction between symptomatic and pre-symptomatic testing, a particular 
research preference for pre-symptomatic genetic testing of children being taken in this 
paper. The crux of the problem was quickly identified to be the interplay between the 
1
.
3 Clinical Genetics Society, 'What is Clinical Genet1·cs' (2009) h t 11 1· 
f 
< t p: www.c 1ngensoc.org/ 
In o_genetics.htm> accessed 25 February 2009. 
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child's competence to consent and the role that the child's best interests, as perceived by 
guardians and courts, would play. This demanded an exposition of the meaning of 
competence and New Zealand's legal position on children and medical decision making. 
Section one goes on to discuss theories of competence before describing the current 
position in New Zealand concerning the distinction between incompetent and competent 
children and the attendant legal consequences of that distinction in a medical context. 
Having laid the domestic legal foundations, an examination was undertaken of the 
meaning afforded by international law to the expressions at issue in this paper: the 
principle of best interests and the closely related right of a child to express his or her views; 
and the term "benefit". Given the subject matter of genetic testing and children, the focus 
remained on the Child Convention and international instruments related to science and 
technological advances. This provided a solid theoretical backdrop to the next step: 
consideration of the application of these principles by a judicial body. 
The second section therefore seeks to elucidate the nature of the best interest principle. lt 
will discuss the principle of best interests of the child, its use and application in 
international law and the closely related principle of the views of the child, as protected 
under Article 12 of the CRC. How the principle of the best interests of the child set out in 
Article 3 of the CRC and Article 8 right to family life contained in the European Convention 
on Human Rights interact in practice will be outlined. As an important regional human 
rights court, the Strasbourg Court can provide valuable guidance as to how the best 
interests principle can operate at a level of human rights adjudication. 
6 
lt was intended to use the Strasbourg Court to also explore how the term benefit is relied 
on in practice. However, no ECHR jurisprudence was identified regarding the meaning of 
benefit in the context of child medical decision making. In its place, the decision of the 
High Court of Australia in Marion5 Case14 was selected as providing a suitably 
authoritative exposition of that question. High Court of Australia decisions are highly 
persuasive in New Zealand and this case served the dual purpose of drawing on the 
distinction between best interests and benefit whilst also relying on language of dignity. lt 
is the third section which examines the use of the expression benefit in both this decision 
and in international conventions. lt will be argued that there are four material differences 
between the two tests. For reasons of substance and procedure, this thesis argues that the 
best interests test remains preferable to that of benefit. 
As a final step in this paper's methodology, the differences perceived between best interests· 
and benefit were pitc_hed against the principle of dignity. lt was important to develop a 
general picture of dignity, including its history, its use within the international and New 
Zealand legal systems before applying it to the question in this paper. Accordingly, the 
fourth section tests the preliminary conclusions derived in section three against a coherent 
conception of dignity and concludes that the dignity of the child is more likely to be 
advanced by a test which possesses the four main features that the benefit test lacks. 
14 0 
epartment of Health & Community Services v jWB & SMB [1992] HCA 15 (HCA) ("Marion's Case"). 
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SECTION ONE: WHAT IS GENETIC TESTING AND THE 
NEW ZEALAND LEGAL POSITION 
PART 1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GENETIC TESTING PROCESS 
1. What is Genetic Testing? 
· 11 f an individual and A genetic test involves taking a sample of DNA-containmg ce s rom 
then applying scientific techniques to that person's DNA to obtain certain genetic 
information. The National Health Medical Research Councills defines it as a test which 
· · lve 
"reveals information" which may be performed on DNA, RNA or protem or may mvo 
measurement of a substance that indirectly reflects gene substance.16 
Genetic information stems from and reflects the particular variations in genetic sequence 
the individual has. Certain genetic sequences almost always cause disease. Others have a 
less certain effect on health and may create a susceptibility to a condition, or protect the 
Then there are those sequences which underlie physical individual from a condition. 
differences such as hair colour and those which have no effect at all. 
Genetic testing may be done for medical, non-medical or reproductive purposes. Genetic 
testing for medical purposes may be defined as ''the analysis of the genetic material to 
identify differences that determine whether an individual has, or will develop, a particular 
15 The National Health and Medical Research Co~~cil ~N~~R~~s ;~h~:a~s~~~~~ bt~d{h:h~~~~~~%~s ~:::~~ 
and medical research, and develops ?ndhprolvht es ead d' al research. See generally: National Health 
rofessionals and governments concernmg eat care an me tc. b 2009 
p d' 1 R h C ·1 'NHMRC' (<http·//www.nhmrc.gov.au/mdex.htm> accessed 7 Septem er · Me tea esearc ounct, · 
· • h' 1 A t f Human Genetic Testing: An Information 
16 National Health Medical Research Counctl, Et tea specs o . . . . f 
p ' (NHMRC 2000) 9 Haemoglobin (a protein) electrophoresis ts earned out to dta~nose carfner~l.ol 
aper : . d ent one can measure blood cholesterol to diagnose amt ta beta-thalassaemia. As regar s measurem , . 
hypercholesterolemia in a child whose parent has the d1sorder. 
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disorder, or has an increased probability of doing so"Y Genetic disorders may include 
chromosomal abnormalities, single gene disorders such as cystic fibrosis, familial cancer or 
cancer prone syndromes such as inherited breast cancer, and birth defects with a genetic 
component of which cleft lip and palates provide common examples.18 The testing 
techniques applied vary in the specificity of their inquiry. At a more general level, the 
subject's chromosomes are examined under a microscope (used to diagnose ''obvious" 
chromosomal abnormalities such as an extra chromosome or large chromosome breakage). 
A more specific species of testing involves probing the subject's DNA for particular genetic 
mutations in known genes. 
Genetic testing for non-medical purposes is carried out to "define individuality and to 
establish relationships by the use of normal genetic variants, or polymorphisms".19 Testing 
for the purposes of defining individuality is predominantly employed to establish identity 
in a forensic setting. Testing to establish relationships is most commonly used to establish 
parentage under the popular label of "paternity testing". For the avoidance of doubt, this 
paper is not concerned with the following: 
(a) genetic testing to establish parentage; 
17 Ontario Law Reform Commissioner, 'Report on Genetic Testing' (Toronto 1996) 11. 
18 Clinical Genetics Society, (accessed 25 February 2009) above n 13. 
19 Ontario Law Reform Commissioner, above n 1 7, 25. 
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(b) genetic testing in a research context, be it a clinical trial or other medical research or 
genetic testing for population studies, such as tracing the historical origins of 
populations;20 or 
· · f reproduct1've purposes (apart from carrier testing). (c) genet1c testmg or This is most 
commonly used for couples contemplating having children and wishing to make 
informed decisions about the health of their future child; couples wishing to employ 
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis during IVF treatment; and couples wishing to have 
pre-natal screening. 
11. The Conditions Genetic Testing Can Uncover 
A ge~etic sample can contain a vast amount of information about an individual. In terms 
of genetic diseases, a genetic sample can be taken for predictive or carrier purposes .. 
Predictive testing can be pre-symptomatic or susceptibility-focussed. Pre-symptomatic 
tests are undertaken to detect conditions which will almost certainly develop at some stage 
during the child's life. For this reason, conditions of this nature are referred to in scientific 
parlance as having 100 percent penetrance: the possession of a particular gene (genotype) 
will inevitably manifest itself in the form of the disease (phenotype). The point at which 
this physical expression occurs is not static. Pre-symptomatic conditions may develop 
during childhood ("early-onset") or later in life ("adult-onset"). Susceptibility testing is 
undertaken to detect conditions that may or may not develop. The test searches for genetic 
20 There is much scholarship on the subject of the ethics of medical rese~rch on ch!ldre~, inc~uding researc~ 
involving genetic tests. For more information, refer: M Otlowski, 'Protectmg Genetic Pr~acyhm th;C~~~~arc, 
Context· Where to From Here' (2002) 2 Macquarie Law journal 87; RE Ashcroft an . ot ers,_ I ren ~ 
Consen; to Research Participation: Social Context and Personal E~perience. !~validate _F1x~d. C~tot: 
Rules' (2003) 3 The American journal of Bioethics 16; Karen Eltis, 'Genetic Det:rmtnlsm an_d DlsC~Iml~atlonf 
A Call to Re-Orient Prevailing Human Rights Discourse to Better Comport With the Public Implications o 
Individual Genetic Testing' (2007) 35 The journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 282. 
10 
mutations which are known to carry an increased predisposition towards the development 
of a particular disease. A positive test for the mutation in question reveals an increased risk 
of manifesting the disease to which that mutation relates. These diseases can also be 
divided into "early-onset" and "adult-onset" sub-categories. The most common types of 
susceptibility testing occur in the realm of familial cancer such as breast and ovarian 
cancer and the concomitant presence of the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 mutations. Although a 
person who tests positive for the BRCA 1 mutation is often referred to as a "carrier" of the 
gene, this does not retroactively place the t~sting within the "carrier testing" category. 
Both kinds of predictive testing enable one to assign a reasonable statistical probability to 
the likelihood of the subject developing the condition. Yet they offer no insight into the 
severity of the predicted condition nor the exact age at which it will arise. 
Carrier testing is about identifying whether a person is carrying a defective gene which may 
affect his or her offspring, rather than his or her own health. However, those who carry a 
genetic disease and those who suffer its symptoms are not two mutually exclusive groups. 
For this reason, the distinction between carrier and predictive testing, in principle and 
practice, is not entirely stable. First, there are situations where a person will be carrying a 
gene which both affects his or her own health and has implications for the health of any 
future children. Familial cancer is a good example. Second, carriers are not always 
unaffected by their condition. Carriers of many X-linked diseases (such as haemophilia 
and muscular dystrophy) are frequently affected.21 In this grey area the distinction 
between carrier and predictive testing is best framed in terms of a rough test of 
comparative impact. If the mutated gene may affect the person's own health to a greater or 
21 HGRP, above n 4, 6. 
11 
equivalent degree to that which any potential offspring might experience then we refer to it 
as "predictive testing". If the mutated gene may affect the individual's children to a greater 
degree, then it is designated as "carrier testing". lt must be conceded that a distinction 
based on these lines is neither perfect nor logically demanded. Yet it does provide a 
coherent taxonomy against which this paper's central issues can be examined. 
There are two main types of genetic carrier status distinguished according to the type of 
disorder to which the status relates: autosomal recessive disorder on the one hand; and sex-
linked disease or balanced chromosomal translocation on the other. Carriers of the former 
can potentially22 transmit that disorder to their offspring only if their respective partners 
also carry the gene for the same disorder. Carriers of the latter risk transmitting the disease 
to their offspring regardless of their partners' genetic status. 
111. Is Genetic Information Special? The Notion of Genetic ·Exceptionalism 
The genetic information of each person is unique and, like most medical information, 
highly personal.23 Yet the breadth and depth of the detail genetic information can reveal 
sets it apart"from the ordinary run of medical information. The idiosyncratic nature of 
genetic information can 24 facilitate the identification of one particular individual to the 
exclusion of everyone else. lt can provide insight into that person's future health and life 
22 Generally, if both parents carry the recessive gene, then there is a 25 percent chance that the child will 
inherit both recessive genes, thereby expressing the disorder. This is because each person has two copies of 
every gene, one inherited from each parent. Each parent has a 50 percent chance of passing on the mutant 
recessive gene to the child (i.e. one out of two genes). This results in a 25 percent chance of the child 
carrying both recessive genes. 
23 SeeS and Marper v The United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50 (ECtHR (Grand Chamber)) at [70]-[77}. 
24 I use "can" in the sense that to identify that a particular sequence belongs to person X, one must have a 
sample from X to compare it to. 
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25 Once acquired, genetic information has the ability to completely destroy any 
anonymity the subject hitherto enjoyed. The scope for misuse and the consequences of 
said misuse are unquantifiable due to considerable uncertainty about the true significance 
and meaning of genetic information. Uncertainty derives from three related sources. First, 
the interrelatedness of genetic information to other factors such as the total genetic 
environment and the physical environment of the individual is deeply obscure. Second, 
widespread misconceptions as to what it means to be a "carrier" of a predisposing gene. 
Third, the absence of a limit as to the scientific advances to which genetic information may 
be subjected to in the future. 26 While, as technology currently stands, genetic information 
is immutable, there is no reason to suppose this will remain so. Our legal analysis must 
pay particular attention to this heightened level of uncertainty not just in determining what 
should be done with genetic information but the logically prior, and potentially more 
important question, of when genetic information in a readily decipherable form should 
come into existence. 
One of the central reasons genetic information is cited as special is its familial or shared 
nature. The individual from whom genetic information is derived is not the only person 
who may maintain an interest in its contents. Genetic information may tell us something 
about blood relatives, both succeeding (potential or actual) and preceding generations. If I 
test positive for familial adenomatous polyposis (an inherited predisposition to bowel 
polyps which, if left undetected, lead to cancer) it tells me my future child will have a 50 
percent chance of developing that disorder. If I turn out to be a carrier of the cystic fibrosis 
25 Otlowski, above n 20, 91. 





gene, it informs me that one of my parents is also a carrier and that my sister could also be 
a carrier. This dynamic is likely to render issues of disclosure, confidentiality and privacy 
of particular importance. More relevantly, it inexorably leads to the existence of a range of 
competing motivations, beyond the medical interests of the tested subject, for conducting a 
genetic test of an individual. 
Plainly, the pervasive reach of genetic information can impact on family dynamics; it may 
strengthen, weaken, create or remove existing family relationshipsP lt may have many 
psychological manifestations: it may create anxiety amongst the family for the affected 
person; the affected person may worry about siblings or his/her reproductive future; a 
sibling who is "cleared" may have feelings of guilt for the sibling who was not. The 
potential scenarios are as infinite as the reactions and interests of the individuals involved 
to the genetic information at issue. A particularly uneasy balance may need to be struck 
between the privacy interests of the person from whom genetic information is derived and 
the benefit another person may have through the disclosure of a genetic susceptibil ity.28 
The hereditary significance of genetic information renders this balance particularly 
awkward given that the competing interests will be arising within the same familial or, at 
least, biological unit. 
The current international position is to recognise that the nature of genetic information 
warrants special protection. This is evidenced through the international instruments which 
single out genetic information as unique and/or put in place specific standards for the 
27 National Health Medical Research Council, 'Ethical Aspects of Human Genetic Testing: An Information 
Paper' above n 1 6, 1 0. 
28 lbid, 10. 
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management of genetic information.29 Opponents of "genetic exceptionalism" argue that 
genetic information is just like any other form of personal health information and does not 
require special protection.30 Indeed, analogies can be drawn between genetic and other 
medical information. For instance, whether a person is HIV positive is highly personal, 
sensitive and can have implications for others. Certainly, HIV status and genetic 
information have considerable analogues. But the conclusion that this symmetry demands 
neither species of information to be treated exceptionally rests upon a flawed premise. A 
person's HIV status is not like any other form of personal health information. The positive 
law of many jurisdictions recognises this.31 Just as HIV status engages special 
considerations, so too does a person's genetic status. 
Admittedly, less exceptional non-genetic tests (although ultimately with a genetic basis) 
can be used to identify predictive information about an individual (blood cholesterol level 
for example). However, as Otlowski argues, it is the cumulative effect of the various 
characteristics of genetic information which afford it the status of special information.32 lt 
cannot be seriously argued that one's most recent cholesterol test has the wide ranging 
implications and engages the broad range of legitimate interests that genetic information of 
29 E.g. see Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine; International Declaration on Human Genetic 
Data 2003 (Adopted by UNESCO on 16 October 2003); Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights 1997 (adopted by UNESCO on 11 November 1997) ("UDHGHR"). 
30 T. Murray, 'Genetic Exceptionalism and 'Future Diaries': Is Genetic Information Different from Other 
Med1c~l Information?' in M Rothstein (ed) Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the 
CenetJc Era (Yale University Press, New Haven 1997). 
31 In New Zealand, criminal nuisance has been interpreted to criminalise an HIV positive individual having 
~n~~otected sex without disclosing his status: Police v Dalley [2005] NZAR 682 (DC). See generally, A Evans, 
Cnt1que of the Criminalisation of Sexual HIV Transmission' (2007) 38 VUWLR 517. New Zealand is also 
considering amendments to the Public Health Act 1956 to permit health authorities to disclose HIV status to 
at risk individuals. 
32 Otlowski, above n 20, 92. 
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the type already mentioned does. Regardless of the direction in which one's moral stance 
leads on the "genetic exceptionalism" debate, as we have already seen, the international 
community has specifically recognised genetic information as special. This alone provides 
support for treating it differently from other types of medical information. 
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PART 2: COMPETENCE & CAPACITY- THEORY AND CRITERIA 
Given that this paper's central question is engaged upon a child being deemed 
incompetent or incapable of consenting, it is necessary to gain an appreciation of what 
these concepts entail. The expression competence or capacity refers to the the ability of a 
person to provide legally binding consent to a particular treatment, procedure or 
intervention. Beyleveld and Brownsword characterise a person in law who is competent to 
give consent as being a "subject of consent" .33 Consent operates as a procedural, rather 
than substantive, justification for a particular action. First, consent is relied on as 
authorising the action notwithstanding the merits of the action itself. Second, it operates to 
prevent the consenting person from claiming against the person who did the action that the 
particular action was wrong.34 Finally, consent is rationalised within the language of 
wrongs rather than substantive rights.35 
lt is difficult to identify the exact criteria of competence, as these change depending on the 
circumstances. However, it is generally agreed that consent is valid if it is freely given and 
informed. lt follows that a person has capacity to consent if two conditions hold. First, the 
person is capable of forming his or her own judgment and making a decision which is free 
from the influence of others (freely given consent). Second, the person is able to 
understand and apply information which is relevant to the decision at hand (informed).36 
33 D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Consent in the law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 93. 
34 lbid 61. 
35 
Take the example of a medical procedure. lt is meaningful to say that consent has operated to preclude the 
health practitioner from committing a wrong (assault). Yet, we do not speak of consent as justifying a breach 
of_the patient's rights. The difference is more than semantic. The language we use can have a significant 
effect on the way in which we perceive the doctor-patient dynamic.--
36 
Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law above n 33,12-13. 
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Translating these requirements into Gewirthian-speak, the subject of consent must have the 
capacity to form a will about the giving or refusing of consentF Such capacity must be 
developed, present at the relevant moment and based on a relevant knowledge and 
understanding of the nature and significance of the consenting act itself.38 
For Raz, the key to competence is a fully autonomous decision, although he somewhat 
incongruously acknowledges that the fully autonomous person does not exist.39 Autonomy 
is the condition permitting each individual to determine his life-plan.40 An autonomous 
decision is taken where an individual has identified those desires which are consistent with 
37 lbid 99. Gewirth's moral theory of rights is set out in A Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1978). Gewirth argued that agents who (prospectively at least) have the capacity 
freely to select and act for a purpose (with a will), logically accept and are bound by the "Principle of 
Generic Consistency" (PGC) whereby agents have reciprocal rights and duties to respect one another's 
freedom and well-being. The PGC is binding on all agents, not because they may take a moral viewpoint of 
some kind, but simply by virtue of an agent adopting any reason at all to a particular action. To defend this 
latter claim, Gewirth attempted to show that if an agent were not bound by the PGC, it would contradict its 
status as an agent. His view requires that rights be understood according to the will theory of rights. In 
MacCormick's view, this creates problems for theories of children's rights. Because some children have no 
capacity for forming a will, a will theory cannot explain the undisputed existence of children's rights. For this 
reason, Gewirth's account cannot provide an exhaustive general theory of rights: N MacConnick, 'Children's 
rights: a test-case for theories of rights' (1976) 32 Archiv fur Recht-und Sozialphilosophie 305. Ho~ever, 
MacCormick's approach need not compel the outright rejection of Gewirth's. That a theory has failed to 
explain entirely does not mean that it has entirely failed to explain. Adoption of the gradualist theory of 
rights for children which protects both interests and choices provides a coherent account of children's rights 
consistent with Gewirth's: when children are young, they have rights to protect their interests; and as they get 
older, gradually their rights evolve to protect their choices: S Brennan, 'Children's Choices or Children's 
Interests: Which do their Rights Protect?' in D Archard and CM Macleod (eds), The Moral and Political Status 
of Children (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002). lt is clear from both MacCormick's and Brennan's 
analyses that children do have rights. Gewirth's theory does accommodate children as "potential" agents. 
Beyleveld and Brownsword expand on this and characterise children as potential ostensible agents whose 
interests can be protected by a third party, usually the parent: Beyleveld and Brownsword Consent in the Law, 
above n 33, 118. 
38 Beyleveld and Brownword, Consent in the Law, above n 33, 99-100. 
39 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986) 155, cited by J Eekelaar, 'The 
Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: the Role of Dynamic Self-Determinism' (1994) 8 International 
journal of Law and the Family 42, 56. 
40 Eekelaar, above n 39, 50. 
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his or her goals, achievable within attainable social forms, and decided to pursue them.41 
A decision apparently inconsistent with the individual's self-interest may still be 
autonomouS.42 This view is consistent with Gewirth's theory of rights: what matters is that 
a choice is free, not that the choice itself violates the decision maker's perceived interests. 
Occasionally, a presumptively competent individual may be stripped of that capacity by 
virtue of the nature of the action consented to. In these circumstances, the giving of 
consent satisfying the two above conditions is insufficient to render that action Iawful.43 
Cases of assisted suicide provide a morally contentious example. A less extreme example 
appears in Wackenheim v France. 44 There, the Human Rights Committee concluded that a 
domestic prohibition on the practice of dwarf throwing was justified on the grounds of 
human dignity notwithstanding the consent of the person being thrown. The Committee 
upheld the French formulation of dignity which operated as a communitarian constraint on 
an individual's will.45 
Eekelaar draws on Raz's work in examining the notion of competence for children. In 
terms of having a goal which is "achievable within attainable social forms", Eekelaar 
emphasises that children's goals may be unrealistic and thus constitutive of an incompetent 
decision. As children do not tend to have a settled identity or life goals any stated goal 
41 lbid, 55. 
42 lbid, 55. 
43 Beyleveld and Brownsword Consent in the Law, above n 33, 16-17. 
44 
Wackenheim v France CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999: France, 26 July 2002 (Human Rights Committee). 
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must be subjected to some scrutiny.46 Hence, a child's wish will not be competently 
expressed if the wish is unrealistic or its realisation extremely improbable.47 Yet, one must 
equally acknowledge that a child's competence should not be denied on the grounds of a 
d 1 · 48 To do so would presumption that life goals are usually unsettled when eve optng. 
empty a child's capacity to consent entirely of content. A complex balance must be struck. 
First, one must consider the nature of the goals themselves. A distinction should be drawn 
I A Ch .tld can be held more capable of between "incidental" and ''important" goa s. 
consenting to the former while the the latter may require more time to develop. If, in light 
of this background, a child's goals are seriously unstable then a conclusion of 
incompetence is justified.49 Second, consideration must also be given to the source of the 
goal: the child or the parent. Third, and relatedly, a choice needs to be made as to the 
level of influence that the law will countenance a third person (parent) exerting over a 
child before a decision is considered invalid for want of free will. 5° 
The foregoing analysis suggests that a child will be competent if: s/he is capable of forming 
her/his own judgment about a particular decision, having considered the information at 
hand, free from any external influence (in particular parents); and the decision itself is not 
clearly unrealistic or improbable The unsettled nature of a child's goals must be borne in 
mind when establishing whether the decision is really unrealistic or improbable. 
Essentially, children need time to make decisions. 
46 Eekelaar, above n 39, 52. 
47 lbid, 55. 
48 lbid, 56. 
49 lbid, 56. 
50 lbid, 56-57. 
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PART 3: NEW ZEALAND'S APPROACH TO CHILDREN AND CONSENT 
1. Statutory Overview 
The relevant statutory framework is found in the COCA and the Health And Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994 ("the HADCA''). The COCA represents, in effect, a comprehensive 
legislative code regulating the day to day guardianship and care of children in New 
Zealand. The HADCA establishes the legislative machinery for the promulgation of a 
document setting out a series of legally enforceable rights for health care consumers which 
bind both private and public health care providers. These rights are contained within the 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights Regulations 1996 ("the 
Code").51 The HADCA also constitutes a Health and Disabilities Commissioner to 
investigate and determine complaints relating to purported breaches of such rights. 
Regardless of capacity, a child patient is deemed a ''health consumer" within the meaning 
of the HADCA and is thus the bearer of a bundle of rights, as set out in the Code. These 
rights include the child's right to be treated with respect;52 the right to be free from 
discrimination, coercion, harassment and exploitation;53 the right to have his or her privacy 
respected; 54 the right to dignity and independence;55 the right to effective 
51 The Code became law on 1 July 1996 as a regulation issued pursuant to the HADCA. 
52 The Code, Right 1 . 
53 The Code, Right 2. 
54 The Code, Right 1 (2). 
55 The Code, Right 3. 
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:11 
communications6 and the right to be fully informed in order to make an informed choice 
or provide informed consentY 
The HADCA defines informed consent to a procedure by a consumer as mandating that 
consent be freely given by the consumer or a person entitled to consent on the consumer's 
behalf and be obtained in accordance with those requirements prescribed by the Code. 
The person acting on the child's behalf is entitled to agree to or refuse treatment. Every 
consumer is presumed competent to make an informed choice and provide informed 
consent unless there are reasonable grounds for believing otherwise.58 lt has been 
suggested that a young child who clearly lacks the maturity and competence to give 
informed consent is a reasonable ground for rebutting this presumption.59 Despite 
diminished competence (which is not defined by age), a child will retain the rights to 
effective communication and to information provided in a manner commensurate with thaf 
child's ability to understand.60 
11. The Meaning of Competence 
While the HADCA's definition of "informed consent" is clearly predicated on the 
competence of the consent provider, it is noticeably silent on the requirements of 
competence. On an operative level, Ministry of Health guidelines issued to practitioners 
direct that a competent person is able to make "a rational, informed choice about 
56 The Code, Right 5. 
57 The Code, Right 6. 
ss The Code, Right 7(2). 
59 HGRP, above n 4, 254. 
60 See Rights 5 and 7(3) of the Code and Ministry of Health (New Zealand), 'Consent in Child and Youth 
Health: Information for Practitioners' <www.moh.govt.nz> accessed 24 March 2009, 17. 
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accepting or refusing the treatment or service being offered, or authorising the collection 
and use of information".61 The expressions "rational and informed" are capable of 
capturing the formulations of competence suggested by Raz and Eekelaar as articulated in 
the preceding part. In positive law terms competence is action-specific. As a matter of 
principle, a child at a given age may be competent to make some decisions and not others: 
a 12 year old boy may be able to consent to having his wisdom teeth removed, on the 
basis that his health practitioner has judged him competent and thus legally able to 
provide binding consent; that same child may. not be deemed competent to consent to a 
more significant operation, such as the removal of a non-malignant tumour. 
From the age of 16, a young person is presumed competent.62 For children under the age 
of 16, New Zealand appears to adopt an understanding-based approach to competence to 
consent, to the exclusion of the strictly applied status-based test determined, somewhat 
arbitrarily, according to age.63 This understanding-based approach crystallised in the 
landmark decision of the House of Lords in Cillick v West Norfolk and Wisbecl? Area 
Health Authority.64 There, the House of Lords held that:65 
61 lbid, 3. 
62 Hawthorne v Cox [2008} 1 NZLR 409 (High Court) (" Hawthorne"). This presumption is consistent with 
the "dual focus on. determination and assistance in s 16(1 )(c)" of the COCA and "the general policy shift 
towards a more-child-centred approach to guardianship": lbid at [54}. lt is also in line with scholars who 
argue for the adoption of the precautionary principle where consent is concerned: Bevleveld and 
Brownswo~·d Consent in the Law, above n 33, 101. This principle addresses the risk of treating~ competent 
person as mcompetent thereby not recognising that person's rights and in practice requires that competence 
be presumed. 
63 Ministry of Health (New Zealand), above n 60, 59. 
64 
Cillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986} 1 AC 112 (HL) ("Cillick'') 
65 lbid at 188-189 per Lord Scarman. 
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the parental right to determine whether or not their minor child below the age of 16 
will have medical treatment terminates if and when the child achieves a sufficient 
understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is 
proposed. lt will be a question of fact whether a child seeking advice has sufficient 
understanding of what is involved to give a consent valid in law. 
Here we see the reappearance of the competence criteria discussed above. Children 
deemed to have "sufficient understanding and intelligence" are said to be "Cillick-
competent". Cil!ick is understood as setting the threshold of understanding higher for 
children compared to adults. 66 lt is the health practitioner (or the courts) who will decide 
whether or not the child is Cillick competent. In Hawthorne v Cox, Heath J effectively 
endorsed the philosophy underpinning the notion of Cillick competence in acknowledging 
the consistency of the COCA with Cil/ick.67 In so doing, His Honour, albeit obliquely, 
settled a significant debate as to the ability of Cillick common law principles to coexist 
alongside the COCA.68 Freeman has argued that competence must be understood in terms 
of "capability of understanding rather than in terms of what-the child actually understands" 
in the sense that a child may not understand what is involved because s/he was not given 
full information. The HADCA goes some distance towards facilitating understanding by 
recognising the child's right to effective communication. 
66 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 'Young People and Consent to Health Care' (NSW Law 
Reform Commission, Sydney 2008) 82. 
67 Hawthome, above n 62. 
68 In a medical context, s 36 of the COCA permits children aged 16 and over to consent to medical treatment 
or procedures as if they were adults. The silence of s 36 on the ability of children aged under 16 to consent 
to identical procedures combined with the saving in subsection (5) of rules of law which did not include 
Gillick led some to argue that Gil/ick competence had no place under the COCA. For a summary of the 
debate see: HGRP, above n 4, 303-306. The HGRP's summary of the applicable law broadly reflects the 
position underpinning Heath j's analysis in Hawthorne. 
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111. The Legal Significance of Competence 
A. The child who lacks competence 
The applicable legal landscape pertaining to consent differs according to whether or not 
the eh i Id is competent to provide consent. At both common law and under statute, if a 
child is considered to lack competence the repository of the power to consent to medical 
treatment is the child's guardian. Health practitioners who disagree with a guardian's 
decision regarding treatment (such as a refusal to consent to a life-saving blood transfusion) 
may apply to the Court under s 31 of the COCA for an order placing the child under the 
guardianship of the Court. The Court may then override the parent's decision if the Court 
finds that such a course is in the best interests of the child.69 In such a situation, 
Baragwanath recognised that the existing legislation represented:70 
a shift in policy from an emphasis on parental rights to exclusive focus on the rights 
of the child, the parents' position being assessed nowadays in terms not of rights but 
of responsibilities. Certainly the power of a parent as guardian includes decision 
making in relation to the child's medical treatment. But the [COCA] emphasises 
that the welfare and best interests of the child are the sole focus of the consideration 
by the Court which may override parental views. That does not however mean that 
the parents' interests and wishes are of other than very great importance. There is a 
presumption that they will receive effect and to the extent that they do not receive 
complete effect they will be recognised as far as is possible compatibly with the 
predominant interests of the child. That is because a child is not to be considered as 
a microcosm insulated from her parents but as far as practicable as part of the 
family of which she and they are the components. 
69 Auckland District Health Board v Z (2007) 26 FRNZ 596 (High CoUit) where the High Court held that it 
Was in the child's best interests to have a life-saving blood transfusion, contrary to her parents wishes. The 
child in question was 4 years old. 
70 I bid at [20] [Emphasis added]. 
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For children unable to consent, parental authority includes a right to decide whether their 
child will undergo a genetic tesf1 as long as the test is in the child's best interests. In this 
manner, consent is justified by reference to the fact that the action was in the child's best 
interests. Some characterise the principle of best interests as limiting the scope of parental 
authority to consent,72 others describe it as justification for the provision of consent on 
behalf of the child.73 Regardless of its precise characterisation, the "best interests" test 
provides the touchstone for what can and cannot be done to an incompetent child in a 
medical context. 
The authority to consent is conferred on parents for the benefit of the child and not for the 
benefit of the parents/4 The scope of parental authority does not preclude the child from 
expressing his or her opinion?5 Section 1 6 of the COCA expressly acknowledges, 
consistently with international law, the evolving capacity of the child in defining a 
guardian's responsibility concerning important matters affecting the child as "determining 
for or with the child, or helping the child to determine" such matters/6 Important matters 
include medical treatment which is not routine in natureP In practice, although parental 
consent will be required to legally authorise a medical intervention for children not 
71 See Waikato District Health Board v F HC HAM 4 December 2008, Andrews J at [75] where the High 
Court recommended that a genetic test be carried out on a seven year old child should the parents deem 
such a test appropriate. 
72 Marion's Case above n 14. 
73 Beyleveld and Brownsword Consent in the Law, above n 33, 118. 
74 Gillick, above n 64, 170. 
75 The interplay between the principle of a child's best interests and the right of the child to express his or her 
wishes under Article 12 of the CRC wi 11 be discussed in Section 3 of this paper. 
76 Emphasis added. 
77 The COCA, s 16(2). 
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deemed to be competent at law, the closer the child is to the "competence threshold", the 
more involved s/he will be in the decision making and consent process. In recognition of 
the importance of recognising autonomy during childhood and affording respect to a 
child's views, children that fall short of full competence are still able to assent to medical 
treatment or procedures.78 
B. The child who is competent 
This paper suggests that if a child is competent to consent then it is the child who has the 
authority to grant or refuse consent and who will be, unless expressed otherwise, in a 
confidential doctor-patient relationship to the exclusion of the parents.79 Moreover, once a 
child has been deemed competent, no further limitation should be placed on the decision, 
particularly in the form of best interests. Although the decision maker is still a "child" for 
the purposes of the COCA, that decision maker is a competent child which demands that 
the best interests principle play no further role. The reasons for this view will be outlined 
below. 
1. Should best interests circumvent a competent child's decision? 
The decision in Cillick created some confusion as to the residual rights or responsibilities 
which parents retained notwithstanding their child being found competent. Both Lords 
78 HGRP, above n 4, 257. A health practitioner cannot rely on an incompetent child's assent in legally 
performing a medical procedure on that child. Valid consent from a competent party on the child's behalf is 
still necessary. The ability of a child to assent to a procedure, though of no legal effect, extends a degree of 
participation in the process to the child in question. 
79 In this situation, the competent child is in, for all intents and purposes, an analogous position to the 
competent adult. Medical law suggests that a legal power vests in the health practitioner to curtail the 
competent adult's decision on matters medical on limited (and unusual) public policy grounds: J Herring, 
Medical Law (Pearsan Education Ltd, Essex 2008) 156. The precise nature of these criteria remain 
Unarticulated and their application to competent children remains unexplored. 
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Scarman and Fraser were in agreement that all parental rights did not disappear until the 
age of majority.80 However, Lord Scarman held that a parent's right to make a medical 
decision concerning a child was extinguished upon a finding that the child was competent 
to make that particular decision.81 Reliance on "residual parental rights" in the realm of 
children and medical decision making manifests itself legally by using the best interests 
standard to override a competent child's decision. In this way, best interests is relied on as 
a protective backstop to prevent a child's decision being given effect. 
lt is suggested here that their Lordships' views regarding the termination of general parental 
rights over their children does not support an argument that the best interests of the child 
should operate as an overarching limitation on a competent child's decision making in 
New Zealand. First, the entire concept of parental rights over children is outdated and has 
been ousted by the language of the COCA. Second, and in any event, for medical decision 
making, it was held that a finding of competence in turn required that parental rights to 
consent were terminated with respect to that decision. 
lt remains to be definitively decided in New Zealand whether a Gillick competent child's 
grant or refusal of consent can be subject to parental or judicial second-guessing via the 
child's best interests or some other standard. Across the Tasman, the NSW Law 
Commission, notwithstanding its support for a child's autonomy, has explicitly preferred a 
protective role for the law in health care matters and hence recommended retaining best 
interests as the limit on a competent child's decision making.82 Some have suggested that 
80 Cillick above n 64, at 171 per Lord Fraser and at 183-184 per Lord Scarman. 
81 Cillick, above n 64, 188-189. 
82 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 66, 56. 
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ultimate limitation of any decision is avoidance of serious harm.83 This paper submits 
it is inherently inconsistent to adopt an autonomy-based approach to the legal status of 
ildren while simultaneously allowing competent decision making by persons under 18 
be subject to a best interests limitation. Such an approach renders the autonomy of the 
ild meaningless and fails to distinguish between competent and incompetent children: 
the best interests of the child is applied indiscriminately to both categories of children. 
Removing a best interests backstop for competent children does not render a judge 
powerless to intervene in a young person's decision. Rather, it should encourage a robust 
analysis of the child's level of competence. 
The tenor of Hawthorne v Cox on this issue is promising. There, Heath J refused to invoke 
the Family Court's guardianship jurisdiction in respect of a 16 year old girl. Having 
examined in detail the statutory framework relating to the decision making of children, His 
Honour concluded that the presumption of competence engaged upon a child turning 16 
has the effect of ousting, as a matter of law, a parent's ability to make any decisions for that 
child. Certainly, Heath J was not concerned with a child who had to satisfy the criteria of 
Gillick competence. Yet there is no reason for supposing that His Honour contemplated 
that a Gillick competent child would have to meet an additional threshold before his/her 
decision on a matter in which s/he was deemed competent was treated as conclusive. 
Viewed thus, Hawthorne comprises a broader statement that decision making power 
resides with those children deemed competent to make such decisions (either by satisfying 
83 In the United Kingdom, serious harm has been suggested as the ultimate limitation of a competent child's 
decision making: G Lansdown, Taking Part: Children 1s Participation in Decision Making (IPPR, London 1995). 
However, the English courts have not set the standard so high and parents may veto a child's decision simply 
on the basis of that they believe their course of action is in the child's best interests: Re W (a minor) (medical 
treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627 (Court of Appeal) ("Re W"). 
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Gillick or via the operation of statutory presumptions) with the role of guardian reduced to 
that of an advisor. Heath J's ventilation of the principles underpinnings 16(1) of the COCA 
("Exercise of Guardianship") confirms this approach:84 
2. 
(a) the younger the child, the more likely it is that decisions about important matters 
will need to be made by his or her guardian; and 
(b) as the child gets older and becomes more mature, the guardianship role changes 
to that of an advisor or a counsellor, endeavouring to assist the child to make 
good decisions. 
Put in those terms, the Act is consistent with the philosophy underpinning Gillick, 
namely that a parent's interest in the development of his or her child does not 
amount to a "right" but is more accurately described as "a responsibility or duty". 
The terms of s 16 itself reflect that position. 
A distinction between a grant and a refusal to consent? 
The ability of a Court to override a competent child's decision can manifest itself in ways 
other than the employment of a best interests backstop. For example, in an attempt to 
avoid upholding a young person's decision to refuse life saving treatment, the English 
courts have held that Gillick competence only extends to consent to treatment, not 
refusal.85 A distinction between the ability to consent to treatment and the ability to refuse 
treatment is i !logical. 86 Freeman warns strongly against such a dichotomy and the 
attendant judicial retreat from the philosophy in Gillick that it representsP The effect of 
the United Kingdom jurisprudence is to permit a person with parental responsibility to veto 
a competent child's refusal of consent while simultaneously empowering the court through 
84 Hawthorne, above n 62, [60] - [61]. 
8 5 Re R (a minor) [1991] 4 All ER 177 (Court of Appeal). 
86 S Elliston, 'If You Know What's Good for You: Refusal of Consent to Medical Treatment by Children' in S 
Mclean (ed) Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics (Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 
Aldershot 1996) 34. 
87 M Freeman, 'Rethinking Cillick' (2005) 13 The International journal of Children's Rights 201. 
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the application of the best interests principle to overrule that child's wishes.88 That is so 
regardless of the child's age and demonstrated competence. This position sits awkwardly 
with the acknowledgment of the English Court of Appeal in Re W that the older the child, 
the greater the weight that should be placed on the child's wishes and that giving effect to 
those wishes is one way of recognising the paramount consideration of the welfare of the 
child. 
The English path of retreating from a recognition of a competent child's ability to decide for 
him or herself has not been followed in New Zealand where a distinction has not been 
drawn between consent and refusal. The HGRP argues that in light of the COCA which 
sees consent and refusal to consent as two sides of the same coin, it is likely that a Gillick 
competent child's decision will be treated as final whether framed in terms of a refusal or 
grant of consent. 89 Indeed, the English approach for children under the age of 16 
represents a wholesale undermining of the rights of children whom the law has deemed 
competent. In so doing, the United Kingdom position has systematically stripped the 
notion of Gillick competence of much of its normative force, implicitly rejected young 
persons as capable and autonomous human persons and rendered itself vulnerable to a 
charge of facilitating discrimination on the basis of age.90 
The English Courts have gone even further than the provision/refusal of consent distinction 
to undermine the health care decisions of competent children. English Courts have 
repeatedly ignored the express refusals of (clearly competent) children to undergo 
88 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) above n 83. 
89 HGRP, above n 4, 303. 
9
° Freeman, Rethinking Cillick, above n 87, 211-212. 
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significant medical procedures by subtly equating a child's best interests with prolonging 
that child's life.91 New Zealand courts should refrain from following this lead. Obiter 
comments from the High Court are encouraging evidence that New Zealand will not adopt 
such a narrow view of best i nterests:92 
3. 
While continuation of life is of great importance it is not necessarily conclusive; 
quality of life must also be considered. There must be a meticulous evaluation of 
the interests of the child, viewed broadly, and of that alone. 
Section 36 of the COCA- a potentia/limit on child decision making? 
In a medical context, s 36 of the COCA has introduced a potential fetter on the parameters 
of a child's consent to a treatment or procedure. Section 36(1) relevantly provides that a 
consent, or refusal to consent, to any medical, surgical or dental treatment or procedure to 
be carried out on the child for the child's benefit, if given by a child aged 16 or over, has 
effect as if the child were of full age. While pre-symptomatic genetic testing remains to be 
authoritatively legitimated as a "medical treatment or procedure" for the purposes of the 
COCA, its recognition as either a medical treatment or procedure is inevitable.93 Given 
that pre-symptomatic genetic testing is caught by s 36, the italicised words have the 
potential to impose an additional obstacle on the ability of a person aged 16 or over to 
consent or refuse to consent to such a test. A literal reading of this provision would give 
rise to two anomalies. First, a minor aged 16 or over would have the right to refuse 
treatment that is to his or her benefit. Yet s/he would be unable to refuse treatment that is 
91 Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993} 1 FLR 386 ; Re P (medical treatment: best 
interests) [20041 2 FLR 1117 (HC). See comments on this issue in J Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility 
Young Children and Hea!thcare Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007) 10. 
92 Auckland District Health Board v Z above n 69, [22}. 
93 HGRP, above n 4, 292-293. 
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not to his/her benefit.94 Second, the decisions of persons deemed fully competent by 
statute would be subjected to more stringent restrictions than those of a child who was 
required to satisfy the Ci/lick competence test. For these reasons, the better view is to read 
the italicised words as redundant and conclude that a minor has the right to consent to or 
refuse treatment, whether it is to the minor's benefit or not.95 In this regard, what is crucial 
is that the procedure or treatment is for the child and not someone else. 96 Therefore, as 
long as the child believes that the treatment or procedure is for his or her own benefit, the 
child's free consent will satisfy s 36. Such an interpretation aligns closely with the general 
principle of medical law that the right of self-determination of an autonomous person 
prevails over a conflicting medical opinion.97 
However, as the HGRP has acknowledged, it may be held that s 36 does limit a competent 
child's consent or refusal to consent to those medical treatments and procedures of benefit" 
to him or her.98 Consistent with the arguments above concerning a possible best interests 
limit on competent children's decisions, it is submitted that such a formulation fails to 
adequately recognise and respect a young person's competency and autonomy by 
introducing a justiciable criterion capable of trumping the young person's decision. Such 
94 HGRP, above n 4, 293. 
95 1bid 293. 
96 lt has been argued that the "benefit proviso" is aimed at preventing minors from consenting to non-
therap~utic procedures such as organ donation, essentially because an organ donation is not a procedure for 
the child but for another: C Thomas, 'The Intolerable Dilemma: Refusal of Consent for the Medical Treatment 
of Chil.dren' (2000) 3 Butterworths Family Law journal 173. This interpretation is interesting in light of the 
exceptt~n contained in Article 13 of the Genetic Testing Protocol to the Oviedo Convention which permits a 
derogatton from the general rule that genetic testing should only be carried out for the health purposes of the 
person tested. This is discussed in greater detail in section three. 
97 GT . 
•ovey, Nutcases Med1cal Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) 56. 
9a H GRP, above n 4, 294. 
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an interpretation could perhaps be made more palatable if the expression "benefit" were 
interpreted broadly to include physical, psychological and emotional benefits.99 In this 
regard, Skegg has noted that the s 36 reference to benefit:100 
is not qualified by 'health', 'bodily', or any such word, so other considerations 
could be taken into account. Furthermore, in other medico-legal contexts, the 
concept of 'benefit' has proved extraordinarily malleable. 
The HGRP has detailed the benefits and harms involved in genetic testing and concluded 
that there is more evidence of benefits arising from genetic testing, particularly if the test is 
sought by the individual who is being tested.101 Indeed, if the test is sought by the young 
person him or herself, this in and of itself shows that the young person sees the testing as 
being beneficial.102 Therefore, as a general proposition, if s 36(1 )(b) were limited by 
benefit, it would appear that young persons between the age of 16 and 18 could request 
and consent to a genetic test. 
*** 
The above sketch of the New Zealand position should be sufficient to demonstrate three 
propositions. First, all persons aged 16 and over are presumed to be competent with the 
result that their refusal or grant of consent to a genetic test will be treated as both final and 
effective at law. There remains the possibility of a statutory "benefit" gloss being 
superimposed onto the refusal or grant of consent, which should be rejected for the 
99 This would only be a partial solution as the existence of any criteria, howsoever defined, provides an 
avenue to challenge an otherwise unchallengeable decision. 
100 PDG Skegg and R Paterson, Medical Law in New Zealand (Brookers, Wellington 2006) 171-203. 
101 HGRP, above n 4, 295. 
102 HGRP, above n 4, 295. Similar reasoning is adopted by Eekelaar in his argument for "dynamic self-
determinism":Eekelaar, above n 39, 48. This argument will be discussed in the section on the child's views. 
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reasons already offered. Second, the decisions of all persons aged under 16 who are 
deemed Gil/ick competent in respect of that specific decision are final and effective at law. 
Finally, decisions affecting children who are not Gillick competent are made by a guardian 
which must act in the child's best interests. Insofar as genetic testing is concerned, it is this 
aspect of the law which the HGRP seeks to challenge. lt argues that the guardian's 
authority to consent or refuse consent must be limited by what is for the child's benefit, 
rather than what is in the child's best interests. 
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SECTION TWO: THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND 
THE CHILD'S WISHES 
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
At its core, human rights adjudication is about resolving conflicts of rights and interests.103 
Children's rights are not exempted from this rubric. This section will discuss two important 
international law principles relevant to the issue of parental authority to consent to the 
genetic test of their child: the best interests of the child; and the right of the child to express 
his or her views, and the application of these principles by the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
For a child old enough to communicate his or her wishes, the right to express his or her 
views can be important in establishing the child's best interests.104 A child who does not 
have the legal capacity to consent to a test retains the right to express his or her views. A 
child's wishes may conflict with the outcome that has been judged to be in the child's best 
interests. Such conflicts are common in the field of health care law in life-or-death 
treatment cases such as blood transfusions for Jehovah's witnesses and organ donations. 
True, these cases are a far cry from a family's decision about whether or not to have their 
young child genetically tested. Nevertheless, the choice to perform a genetic test can be a 
very important decision, particularly if the test is for an adult-onset disorder or to 
determine carrier status. 
103 S Besson, 'Enforcing the child's right to know their origins: contrasting approaches under the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights' (2007) 21 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 137. 
104 D Archard and M Skivenes, 'Balancing a Child's Best Interests and a Child's Views' (2009) 17 International 
Journal of Children's Rights 1, 15. 
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This section will begin by sketching the meaning of best interests in international law. This 
discussion will provide the background for an examination of how the principle of best 
interests has been relied on by the European Court of Human Rights. First, it will focus on 
how the best interests of the child and the Article 8 right to family life contained in the 
ECHR interact in practice. Second, it will analyse the manner in which the Strasbourg 
Court and European Commission on Human Rights have dealt with cases where the above 
provisions pull in opposite directions.105 The final part will consider the child's right to 
express his or her views, in particular reconciling this principle with that of the child's best 
interests. Both the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court and New Zealand domestic 
courts will be examined. 
PART 2: THE MEANING OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
The principle of the best interests of the child, now regarded as the prevailing discourse 
with regard to the rights of the child, was conceived as a principle of Anglo-American 
family law, applied by courts and quasi-judicial bodies in the areas of matrimony, 
adoption, fostering and guardianship.106 This traditionally paternalistic principle1o7 has 
now been incorporated into the Child Convention,108 a document which in many ways 
promotes a more autonomous view of the child, in line with a "self-determination" view of 
children's rights. 
105 ~t the time of w:itin~, the_S_tras_bourg ~ourt has not dealt with the disclosure of genetic testing to children 
outs1de the realm ot the identification of b10logical parentage. 
106 C Breen, The Standard of the Best Interests of the Child: a Western TradiUon in International and 
Comparative Law (International Studies in Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 2002) 9. 
101 I 
n the sense that it involves a detached third party deciding, independently of the child who is primarily 
affected by the decision, what is best for that child without recourse to the child's views. 
108 
The Child Convention, above n 5. 
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I. The Child Convention- Overview 
The Child Convention, ''the central international instrument on children's rights",109 
accords an extensive range of first generation and second generation human rights to 
persons under the age of 18 years. Due to its almost universal ratification, it can be 
cogently argued that parts of the Child Convention contribute to the fabric of customary 
international law.110 Yet, this does not mean, in light of the many reservations without 
corresponding objections, that the Child Convention in its entirety is customary law.111 
The CRC has not been incorporated into New Zealand domestic law. However, judges 
routinely draw on principles of the Convention 112 when making decisions while the best 
interests principle has been codified in s 4 of the COCA. 
The CRC is based on four core principles: non-discrimination; the best interests of the 
child; the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of the child. 
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has classified the Child 
Convention's substantive provisions according to eight themes: the definition of the child; 
general principles; civil rights and freedoms; family environment and alternative care; 
basic health and welfare; education, leisure and cultural activities; and special protection 
measures.113 The Human Rights Committee emphasises that although the Convention is 
109 T Buck, International Child Law (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London 2005) 41. 
110 Some parts of the Child Convention may simply be a codification of what was already customary 
international law, such as Article 37 which relates to torture. 
111 G Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (International Studies in Human Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) 55. 
112 A Brookers (Briefcase) search reveals over 200 New Zealand cases where the CRC has been referred to. 
113 Human Rights Committee on the Rights of the Child, 'General Guidelines Regarding the Form and 
Content of Initial Reports to be Submitted by States Parties under Article 44, Paragraph 1 (a), of the 
Convention' (UN Doe CRC/C/5, 1991 ). 
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split into different sections, equal importance shall be attached to each section.114 The 
general principles theme encompasses Article 2 Non-discrimination, Article 3 Best interests 
of the child, Article 6 The right to life, survival and development and Article 12 Respect for 
the views of the child. 115 Articles 3 and 12 interrelate and, as should already be clear, are 
particularly germane to the issue of genetic testing of children. 
11. Meaning of "The Best Interests of the Child" in International Law 
Article 3 of the CRC provides that: 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authoritative or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is 
necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his 
or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or 
her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative 
measures. 
3. State Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities 
responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards 
established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in 
the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The article has been universally accepted as stated.116 Article 3(1) does not of itself create 
rights or duties,117 but appears to lend backbone to the other rights and duties contained in 
the Child Convention. However, this relationship is not entirely clear.118 The use of "a" 
1141bid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Unlike many other provisions in the CRC, no reservations have been made to Article 3. 
117 See als~ M Free.man, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' in A Alen and others (eds), A Commentary 
on the Umted NatJOns Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2007) 4. 
Van Bueren, above n 111, 46. 
1"18 Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 4. 
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1: i 
instead of "the" in defining "primary consideration/! may have weakened the primacy of 
the principle and permits States to balance it against other considerations of equal 
importance.119 Van Bueren has queried the exact status of the best interests of the child in 
. k d I " bl. 1· /! 12° F international law and whether 1t would ta e secon pace to pu 1c po 1cy . reeman 
argues that at the very least, the principle in Article 3(1) is both informed by and 
constrained by the rights and other principles in the CRC.121 An outcome which conflicts 
with other CRC rights cannot be said to be in the child's best interests.122 
Article 3(1) states that the child's best interests shall be a primary consideration for all 
actions concerning children taken by "public or private social welfare institutions, courts of 
law, administrative authoritative or legislative bodies/!. Freeman states that this does not 
apply to parents.123 However, following a thorough examination of the drafting history of 
Article 3, Alston is not so convinced and provides three reasons why private actors may be 
covered.124 First, Article 3(1) states a general principle (rather than prescribing duties) 
which should inform all decision making concerning children, including private family 
decisions. This argument is strengthened by the reference in Articles 18(1) and 27(2) of the 
CRC to parental responsibility in relation to the child. Secondly, the word "official" was 
deleted from the final version of Article 3(1) inferring that it was intended "to leave the 
119 Van Bueren above n 111, 46. 
12° lbid 48. 
m Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 5. 
122 J Tobin, 'Beyond the Supermarket Shelf: Using a Rights Based Approach to Address Children's Health 
Needs' (2006) 14 The International journal of Children's Rights 275, 287. 
123 Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 41. 
124 p Alston, 'The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights' (1994) 8 
International journal of Law and the Family 1, 15. 
door open/! to its application ·to non-official entities as well. Finally, and related to the 
second point, the inclusion of the expression "private social welfare institutions" in Article 
3(1) further indicates that it is not solely intended for public undertakings. The application 
in New Zealand of Article 3(1) to private actors, namely guardians, is moot in light of the 
express adoption of the best interests principle into s 4 of the COCA. 
Little consideration tends to be afforded to the independent role that best plays in the 
determination of the composite expression "best interests". lt fulfils an important role. 
Here, best is an adjective pertaining to the noun "interests", thereby modifying the effect 
"interests" has. Best requires that the path adopted not only be one in the child's interests 
but that it be in the child's best interests. Best is defined as "of the most excellent or 
desirable quality"125 and denotes a measure of optimisation. This one simple word 
demands not just that the action in question yield a benefit to the child but that balance of 
benefits and detriments outweigh those of any other alternative course of action. 
The principle of the child's best interests traditionally operated as a "self-imposed limitation 
o d lt " 126 I . d . I n a u power . t compnse an mtegra component of many domestic legal systems 
well before the promulgation of the CRC. Internationally, the principle was, to varying 
degrees, manifest in the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child,127 the UN Declaration 
125 c s 
. oanes and A Stevenson (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of English (Revised edn Oxford University Press 
Oxtord 2005). ' 
12Gv an Bueren above n 111, 45. 
127 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child 1959 (GNRes/1386(XIV) on 20 November 1959). 
The expression Jlbest interests'' was referred to in Principles 2 and 7. 
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on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children128 and 
other treaties.129 
Somewhat incongruously, there was no mention of the child's best interests in the ECHR or 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.130 Van Bueren attributes this 
omission to the perception that "the rights approach of human rights treaties is at odds with 
the traditional welfare approach of best interests which undermines the child's 
autonomy".13 1 A paternalistic principle of best interests (also known as a "relationship-
based welfare approach") 132 which served to curb a child's autonomy was the antithesis of 
the central goal of human rights treaties: to recognise each individual's dignity and 
autonomy. 
lt is here submitted, in line with arguments made elsewhere, 133 that the best interests of the 
child as formulated in the Child Convention has since moved away from a simple welfare, 
paternalistic and domestic law formulation of a child's best interests towards a broader and 
more complex principle of interpretation in international law. First, the CRC is a human 
rights treaty which has also incorporated the expression. This is, of itself, evidence of a 
shift away from the traditional concept of best interests since as we have seen above, a 
128 United Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of 
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally 1985 (GN 
Res/41/85 on 3 December 1986). See, e.g. Article 5. 
129 S Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague 1999) 86. 
130 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, opened for signature on 16 December 1966 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) ("ICCPR"). 
131 Van Bueren, above n 111, 46. 
m J Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law (2nd edn Lexis Nexis, Edinburgh 2003) 22. 
133 Van Bueren, above n 111. See also, Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child', above n 117. 
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simple welfare and paternalistic principle is at odds with human rights. 134 Second, as a 
human rights treaty, it is arguable that its principles, including that of best interests, should 
be relevant to the interpretation of other treaties. Such an approach accords with the 
Preamble of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969135 which recalls those 
principles of international law embodied in the UN Charter, including "universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all". Third, the 
reliance on the principle at the regional level, in particular the European Court of Human 
Rights, provides further evidence that it has become a general principle of international 
law,. with strong interpretative value. 136 lt is suggested that according such a broad 
interpretative role to Article 3(1) fulfils the three discrete uses predicted by Alston for the 
principle: one of supporting, justifying or clarifying a particular approach taken to CRC 
issues; one of mediating between (conflicting) rights; and, one of evaluating the laws and 
practices of the states parties in circumstances where positive rights are not in play.137 
Such roles are similar to those described by McCrudden for the application of the principle 
of dignity. This will be discussed further in the fourth section on dignity. 
However, even if one accepts that best interests can properly operate as a general principle 
of interpretation in international law, the effectiveness and scope of such a principle 
remains unclear. Indeed, it has been argued that the best interests principle is plagued by 
a number of potential weaknesses. Some of these criticisms are cogent; others illusory. 
134 Van Bueren, above n 113, 46. 
135 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 1155 U NTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) 
("VCLT"). 
136 Alston, above n 124, 4. 
137 lbid, 1 5-16. 
43 
First, the application of the best interests principle requires some idea of its subject: the 
child. 138 Yet, the "child" as a legal notion is a societal construct. Society has arbitrarily 
decided that a child means every human being under the age of 18, unless the age of 
majority is attained earlier in accordance with the national law.139 This arbitrariness has 
two related consequences. Most obviously, assumptions as to what a child is and the 
purposes underlining the separate legal treatment of children are concealed and creep 
uncontrolled into judicial analysis. Indirectly, the composite term the "best interests of the 
child" can be transformed into a clumsy rhetorical device capable of supporting any 
judicial decision on matters involving children without revealing the reasoning process 
which led to that result. This is not to presuppose that there is one universally correct 
outcome in each case involving a child's interests, howsoever defined. Rather, that rational 
justification and clarity of the debate demands that a transparent legal framework be 
available for determining what are inherently contestable claims concerning children. If 
assumptions about children are to be made, they should be revealed. If best interests is to 
be the cornerstone around which the jurisprudence in this area is organised, its 
requirements need to be laid bare. At a very minimum, this must involve the development 
of a clearer conception of the subject of this regime: the child. 
Such a process is already underway in New Zealand where its courts have rejected a 
strictly age-based view of competence in favour of a more nuanced formulation. By 
looking behind the threshold of 18 years, in accepting that children of the age of 16 are 
presumed competent and children under 16 can still be deemed Cillick competent and 
138 Breen, above n 1 06, 18. 
139 The Child Convention above n 5, Article 1. In New Zealand the age of majority is 18. 
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able to make their own health care decisions the New Zealand Courts have gone some 
distance to assuage the above concerns. Instead of an arbitrary label, "child" has been 
turned into a highly fact sensitive construct which seeks to capture a complex balance 
between notions of reduced decision making ability and heightened parental 
responsibility. 
Second, as a general interpretative principle in international law in matters concerning 
children, Article 3 does not explicitly resolve many fundamental questions, notably who 
decides on the allocation of decision making responsibilities between the child, the family 
and the state in particular circumstances.140 The International Symposium on Bioethics 
and the Rights of the Child concluded that when interests differ, the child's best interests 
should, in principle, prevail over that of the adult.141 However, that rule of thumb offers no 
assistance in resolving a situation where what is regarded as being in the child's best' 
interests conflicts with the child's wishes. This issue will be addressed below in the part on 
the child's views. 
Third, the best interests principle is indeterminate.142 lt is not defined with the CRC itself 
and its meaning was not even debated in the negotiation of the Child Convention.143 There 
140 Breen, above n 1 06, 49. 
141 J Danois, 'International Symposium: Bioethics and the Rights of the Child' (2000) Human Rights Defender 
10. 
142 Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 2. 
143 lbid 26. 
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have been attempts to define best interests. For his part, Eekelaar defines best interests 
as:144 
Basic interests, for example to physical, emotional and intellectual care; 
developmental interests, to enter adulthood as far as possible without disadvantage; 
autonomy interests, especially the freedom to choose a lifestyle of their own. 
The indeterminacy of the best interests principle permits "other principles and policies [to] 
exert an influence from behind [its] 'smokescreen"'145 and provides a convenient cloak for 
bias, paternalism and capricious decision making.146 lt is this criticism of best interests 
which the HGRP emphasises to support its position: the ability for other considerations to 
be taken into account and usurp the child's interests regarding the genetic test. Such a 
concern is well-founded. 147 However, it is important not to overplay the indeterminate 
nature of best interests. For one, it is indeterminate because it is an international human 
rights norm which aims for universality.148 Its indeterminacy "serves to emphasise the 
importance both of institutions as a means through which to pursue the [interpretative] 
enterprise and of the need to develop a better understanding of the different cultural 
dimensions of the relevant norrns".149 In any event, the scope of any indeterminacy is 
limited by two factors: the application of domestic norms and the terms of the Child 
Convention itself. 
144 J Eekelaar, 'The importance of thinking that children have rights' (1992) 6 International Journal of Law and 
the Family 221,230-231. 
145 Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 2. 
146 S Parker, 'The Best Interests of the Child- Principles and Problems' (1994) 8 International Journal of Law 
and the Family 26. 
147 Some of the most difficult best interests cases relate to medical decision making: Freeman, 'Article 3: The 
Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 3. 
148 Alston, above n 124, 18. 
149 lbid, 18. 
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Fourth, and closely related to indeterminacy, the standard of best interests tends to be 
plagued by arbitrariness resulting in inconsistency of application, both domestically and 
internationally, the latter due predominantly to the numerous social and cultural variations 
which exist on the nature of "the child" and his or her best interests.150 Like criticisms 
levelled at the arbitrary nature of the child, this seemingly reduces to a concern that best 
interests results in unsatisfactory legal opacity and becomes a vessel for the pursuit of 
interests extraneous to the child. Viewed thus, the best interests standard becomes 
meaningless, since it possesses "a complexity of contradictions, both in terms of 
interpretation and application" .151 
Fifth, a perceived problem of the best interests principle resides in the reality that what may 
be in the best interests of the child at the time of the decision making may quickly change-
judges are unable to foresee all future circumstances which may operate to significantly 
alter the situation. 152 However, there is nothing new in this. Dealing with probabilities 
rather than certainties is what judges do. When determining the applicable law in any 
given case, a trial judge is necessarily hazarding a prediction as to the law that an 
appellate court will apply should the case come before that court.153 Moreover, many 
legal standards require a determination of what will occur in the future. When an 
injunction is sought on the grounds that "irreparable harm" will result if the defendant is 
permitted to continue in a course of action, the presiding judge must estimate the 
150 Breen, above n 1 06, 17. 
151 lbid 17. 
152 lbid 17. 
153 See generally: J Leubsdorf, 'The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions' (1978) 91 Harvard Law Review 525, 
556. 
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magnitude of the respective irreparable harms suffered by the defendant (if the injunction 
wrongly issues) and the plaintiff (if it is incorrectly withheld). In such circumstances, a 
judge ex ante is making a decision which ex post facto can be shown to have irretrievably 
damaged legal rights. True, a child's future may not be involved,154 but the point is that 
uncertainty in decision making within the legal system is ubiquitous and hardly new to 
judges. 
Notwithstanding any criticism of the best interests principle, through the application of the 
CRC, it is a mandatory consideration to be taken into account at both domestic and 
international levels for matters concerning children. For all its flaws, the concept of "best 
interests" is not redundant. Yet the foregoing analysis should demonstrate that whatever 
legal formula we adopt to mediate the interface between children and medical decision 
making, it be clear, coherent and transparent. 
PART 3: THE APPLICATION OF BEST INTERESTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
I. The European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union 
A. Overview and general principles of interpretation 
Traditionally, the European Union has not had a "fully fledged" children's policy and EU 
law has been shaped by "the dominant ideology of the family and children's roles within 
154 However, in Hague Convention cases, injunctions could be be obtained in proceedings to enjoin a parent 
from removing a child from the jurisdiction: Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, concluded 25 October 1980 (Entered into force 1 December 1985). 
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the 'the family"'. 155 This ideology pigeonholes family members into fixed roles, with 
parents having control over their dependent children, who lack individual autonomy.156 
Despite the wide ratification of the CRC, it was not until the late 1990's that the EU started 
to move away from the dominant ideology of the family and began to recognise that 
children are "competent, autonomous individuals, whose choices, views and values are to 
be heard and respected" ,157 with interests that deserved protection .158 In terms of the 
Council of Europe's approach, the European Convention focuses on rights of a civil and 
political nature and does not reiterate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' 
standards of social and economic rights.159 In this respect, the European Convention does 
not refer to the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society and lacks "even the 
most basic recognition of the rights of the child", 160 despite the fact that the family is 
generally regarded as a separate unit around which society is arranged. 161 
Two regional developments provided the catalyst for the dismantling of European reticence 
towards the rights of children.162 First, the Council of Europe's initiative of the European 
155 C McGiynn, Families and the European Union :law, politics and pluralism (Law and sociology, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2006) 42. 
156Jbid. 
157 lbid 43. 
158 lbid 66. 
159 U Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (Programme on International Rights 
of the Child, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999) 2-3. 
160 lbid 3. 
161 Van Bueren, above n 111, introductory chapter at xxi. 
162 In this respect "European" is referring to Europe's two main political organisations: the Council of Europe 




Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights163 emphasised the applicability of the best 
interests principle in European law cases involving children.164 The scope and object of 
the ECECR is set out in Article 1 which in relevant part provides: 
The object ofthe present Convention is, in the best interests of children, to promote 
their rights, to grant them procedural rights and to facilitate the exercise of these 
rights by ensuring that children are, themselves or through other persons or bodies, 
informed and allowed to participate in proceedings affecting them before a judicial 
authority. 
The ECECR emphasises the applicability of the best interests principle in Article 8 cases for 
those states that have ratified it. However, thus far it has not been widely ratified.165 The 
Explanatory Report to the ECECR observes that it was intended to strengthen the 
substantive rights contained in the Child Convention by creating procedural rights that 
could be exercised by children themselves or through other persons or bodies.166 Indeed, 
Freeman has described it as an attempt to "invigorate the provisions of the [Child 
Convention]", 167 but notes certain drawbacks: most of the protection is limited to children 
of sufficient understanding; and there are no rights to information, to be consulted or to 
express views. 168 
163 European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights, opened for signature 25 January 1996 (entered 
into force 1 July 2000) ETS No. 60 ("the ECECR") . 
164 Ibid. The preamble of the ECECR explicitly cites the Child Convention and the best interests principle. 
165 As at 31 October 2008, 24 members have signed of which only 13 subsequently ratified. Member states 
that have not ratified this Convention include Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain have ratified. 
166 Council of Europe, 'Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights 
1996' < http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/reports/html/160.htm> accessed 8 January 2009, para 7. 
167 Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 23. 
168 !bid 23. 
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Second, the adoption by the European Union of the EU Charter169 in 2000 represented a 
commitment to provisions safeguarding children's rights and set out the principle of the 
best interests of the child. This Charter has broadened the European Union's jurisdictional 
scope from traditional economic and trade matters to include individual rights.l7o lt is 
submitted that the latter development was the more significant for two reasons. First, the 
ECECR is rendered expressly subordinate to other treaties. 171 Second, the Strasbourg Court 
does not supervise the ECECR. Rather, a "Standing Committee" is established to review its 
operation. Consistent with that relative importance, it has been argued that it was only 
when the Charter was adopted in 2000 that a "progressive approach to children and their 
rights entered into Union law and policy", with children finally being recognised as 
"independent subjects of Union law and policy, with their own particular needs and 
desires, separate from the interests of families, parents or other policy objectives".l72 
The principle of the best interests of the child is contained in Article 24(2) of the Charter.l73 
This codification within EU law has meant that for the first time children's interests are 
considerations in all areas of policy which "relate" to children.174 In addition, the Charter 
has maintained the CRC wording that "best interests" is only "a" consideration which is to 
169 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364("EU Charter") 
170 Wicks, above n 2, 7. 
171 Refer Article 15 of the ECECR, above n 163. 
172 McGiynn, above n 155, 67. 
173 T~e wordi~g of Article 24(2) reflects Article 3(1) in a more summary form and provides that "in all actions 
relatmg to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child's best interests must 
be a primary consideration". --
"174 McGiynn, above n 155, 69. 
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be balanced against other factors such as justice and society which, within the EU, "may 
give rise to unforeseen and potentially adverse consequences".175 
It is of course the European Convention itself which furnishes the practical link between 
rights and redress. Under its provisions, member states are obliged to "secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction" the rights and freedoms of the European Convention and children 
have successfully brought cases before the European Court of Human Rights.176 The rights 
in the European Convention are a source of general principles of European Community 
law.177 The courts of member states have an overarching duty to construe legislation 
compatibly with Convention rights.178 There are four general principles of interpretation of 
the European Convention that have arisen from Strasbourg Court jurisprudence. First, the 
Convention is to be interpreted purposively, in a manner consistent with its overall aims179 
resulting in rights that are "practical and effective" and not "theoretical and illusory".180 
Second, the European Convention shall be interpreted as a living instrument thereby 
maintaining its relevance to social and legal standards.181 Third, states have the benefit of 
175 lbid 70. 
176 Van Bueren, above n 111, 22. The European Court of Human Rights, since the passage of Protocol 11 
which came into force in November 1998, operates as a single Court of Human Rights and sits in Strasbourg 
on a permanent basis. 
177 HC Kruger, 'The European Union Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights: An Overview ' 
in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy: Essays in 
European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) introduction at xxi. 
178 Buck, above n 109, 111. 
179 lbid 114. 
180 Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305 ((ECtHR)) 
181 Kilkelly, above n 159, 13. 
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a margm of appreciation 182 or a measure of discretion which is subject to the ultimate 
supervision of the European Court. When a balancing of rights is concerned, the margin of 
appreciation will be broad.183 Finally, the European Court of Human Rights adopts the 
principle of proportionality requiring: 184 
that the relationship between the means employed by a state to interfere with a right 
is proportional to the legitimate aims of such interference ... [such] an assessment 
requires an attempt to strike a fair balance between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. 
These four principles are of general relevance in determining how the best interests 
standard in the CRC (and in the Charter) and the right to respect for family life are 
reconciled by the Strasbourg Court in cases of conflict. 
B. Reconciling the CRC and the European Convention in cases involving children 
The precise legal relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
CRC depends greatly on the legal system of the state in question and the practical issue of 
enforcement. As a starting point, state parties are bound by the provisions of both the CRC 
and the European Convention.185 Next, one must consider whether the state in question is 
dualist or monist. 
If dualist, the general rule is that both the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Child Convention remain part of international law unless specifically incorporated into 
182 lbid 6. Professor Kilkelly notes that the margin of appreciation is "frequently decisive of the scope of 
protection which the European Convention offers, particularly in children's cases". The principle of the 
margin of appreciation was explained by the European Court of Human Rights in Handyside v UK (1976) 1 
EHRR 737 (ECtHR) [48]-[49]. 
183 Besson, above n 103. 
184 Buck, above n 109, 114. 
185 VCLT, above n 135, Article 26. 
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domestic law.186 Once incorporated, they have force of domestic law and any conflicts are 
to be reconciled using statutory interpretation. In dualist member states such as the United 
Kingdom and Germany, the European Convention has been incorporated into domestic 
law and has the force of statute. By contrast, the Child Convention has not been 
incorporated. This essentially creates a hierarchy between the two treaties, with the 
European Convention holding the primary position. Moreover, the CRC cannot be relied 
on directly by individuals in a dualist country as a basis for jurisdiction and no domestic 
court can assess a claim that a Child Convention right has been infringed.187 Rather, the 
CRC will have effect as a relevant treaty to be taken into account in cases involving 
children, both at the domestic level and at the Strasbourg Court level. 
If monist, then individuals within that state can rely on rights and/or duties contained in 
international treaties as if they were part of domestic law. Moreover, in some monist 
countries, treaties can override acts of Parliament.188 For example, The Netherlands and 
France treat treaty law as prevailing over domestic law and the Dutch courts have used the 
European Convention to set aside Acts of Parliament. In theory, in monist jurisdictions, 
186 Granting a treaty legal effect in domestic law can be achieved in different ways. For example, in Italy, 
incorporation can be brought about by a constitutional law, an ordinary law, a presidential decree or an 
administrative act. There are two procedures available. The "special procedure" consists of an 
implementation order which provides that the entire Treaty is to apply without any changes in domestic law. 
The "ordinary procedure" requires substantive legislation incorporating the relevant treaty obligations. See 
generally: Council of Europe and British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Treaty Making: 
Expression of Consent by States to be Bound by a Treaty (Kiuwer Law International, The Hague 2001) 92. 
187 Fortin, above n 132, 44. 
188 lt is important to distinguish direct applicability from the status or "rank" an international treaty has once 
part of the domestic legal system. For example, in Italy (a dualist state), although the ECHR required a 
legislative act to lend it legal force, recent decisions of the Constitutional Court have granted it superiority 
over domestic statutes. See e.g. judgment No. 349 (24 October 2007) (Carte Costituzionale) [2008] 17 
International Yearbook of Italian Law 292 where a provision of domestic legislation was held to breach 
Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR (concerning the protection of property) and therefore was 
deemed unconstitutional. 
both the Child Convention and the European Convention have an equal status as two 
international treaties to which the states are parties. Individuals can directly rely on the 
CRC and European Convention rights and duties to base a claim in their courts. However, 
at the Strasbourg Court level, jurisdiction is founded solely in terms of the European 
Convention. On this stage, the Child Convention is only of secondary importance - as 
long as a decision is not inconsistent with the CRC, the state will be complying with its 
obligations under the Child Convention. 
What then is the role of the Strasbourg Court in the protection of children's rights? The 
European Convention is not designed to deal with children's claims and is neutral on the 
delineation of the boundary between parental responsibility and children's rights. 189 
Moreover, Article 8 ostensibly protects adults' privacy to the exclusion of that of 
children.190 A primary concern, which has already been recorded, is the lack of a best 
interests principle within the European Convention. 
However, the open-textured nature of Article 8 has the capacity to enhance the protection 
which it offers children.191 Indeed, broadly-framed provisions such as Article 8 are 
routinely employed to protect children and although the Strasbourg Court could have 
continued down a line of favouring parents, it has not done so.192 Its interpretation of 
Article 8 is discussed in the next section. 
189 Fortin, above n 132, 53 -54. Indeed, the Convention's focus is civil and political rights. 
190 lbid 54. 
191 Kilkelly, above n 159, 13. 
192 See johansen v Norway (1996) 23 EHRR 33 (ECtHR) ("johansen"). 
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Professor Kilkelly emphasises that the European Convention, as a system of human rights 
protection, cannot and does not in practice, operate in isolation from surrounding legal 
and social influences. In this respect, the Strasbourg Court relies on factors outside the 
European Convention, including those legal instruments and treaties which make up 
regional and international human rights law.193 Both the CRC and the Charter are 
obviously important developments to the application of the European Convention to 
children. In situations where the European Convention is silent, the CRC provides a "clear 
and comprehensive code of children's rights".194 Provided that any adoption of the Child 
Convention principles produce a result that is compatible with the object and purpose of 
the European Convention, relying on the CRC is "entirely acceptable".195 lt is also 
suggested that even when the European Convention is not silent, the Charter and the 
general principles of the CRC are relevant considerations in matters concerning children. 
C. The scope of Article 8 of the ECHR 
Article 8(1) sets out the scope of the substantive right and includes two central expressions 
"family life" and "private life". Article 8(2) sets out a broad catalogue of permissible 
interferences with that right. The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the 
expression "family life" broadly to include de facto family life, thereby protecting a tie 
between near relatives such as grandparents and grandchildren.196 The expression "private 
life" has been drawn in a similarly broad fashion, yet the Court has stopped short of 
193 Kilkelly, above n 159, 14-15. 
194 lbid 15. 
195 lbid 115-16. 




formulating an exhaustive definition.197 Certainly, "private life" encompasses the physical 
and moral integrity of a person and captures a medical intervention, such as a blood test 
required in paternity actions.198 lt also includes access to, and the protection of, personal 
information 199 and medical data.200 Although Article 8(2) clearly sets out the negative 
obligations on states, the right to private life has been interpreted as imposing positive 
obligations, including, in one instance, an obligation on the national authorities to 
facilitate a reunion between family members.201 Children must also have rights under 
Article 8 and it has been argued that an outcome which is contrary to a child's best 
interests is a breach of the child's right to respect for family life under Article 8.202 lt was 
recognised early on, by the European Commission on Human Rights, that a child's best 
interests could operate as a justified limitation of a parent's right of access to his child 
under Article 8 of the ECHR.203 In limiting or even overriding a right of a parent under the 
ECHR, the Strasbourg Court has explicitly noted that "a parent cannot be entitled under 
197 See generally Fried! v Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 83 (European Commission on Human Rights), Peck v 
United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41 (ECtHR), Niemitz v Germany (199;2) 16 EHRR 97 (ECtHR). Arguably, 
Courts are comforted by the availability of a broad residual right which deserving claims can be shifted into 
when the wording of more precise provisions does not apply. This could explain the failure to exhaustively 
define the parameters of "private life". 
198 Buck, above n 109, 116. 
199 Gaskin v United Kingdom (1989) 12 EHRR 36 (ECtHR). 
200 Z v Finland (1997) 25 EHRR 371 (ECtHR). 
201 Hokkanen v Finland (1994) 19 EHRR 139 (ECtHR) ("Hokkanen" ). 
202 See The Netherlands submissions in Hendriks v The Netherlands (1982) 5 EHRR 223, E Corn HR 8427/78 
(European Commission of Human Rights)- ("Hendriks"). 
203 Hendriks, above n 202. 
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Article 8 of the Convention to have such measures taken as would harm the child's health 
and development" .2o4 
However, there remain both procedural and substantive problems with the Strabourg 
Court's approach. Fundamentally, it characterises the best interests of the child as 
informing the justified limitation question rather than fashioning the content of the Article 
8 right. The difference between the two processes is more than semantic. The former 
approach necessarily results in any consideration of the best interests of the child taking 
place in the context of a prima facie infringement of an adult right. That Article 8(2) calls 
upon the state to justify the infringement immediately places the best interests of the child 
on the back foot. A presumption that the adult's application should succeed is effectively 
imposed before the child's interests are even considered. The latter approach avoids the 
best interests of the child being hijacked by the rhetoric of an established rights 
infringement. In this way, the best interests of the child and the pleaded interests of the 
relevant adult engage on an even playing field, devoid of any de facto presumptions, in 
determining whether an Article 8 right is even triggered and, if so, what the precise nature 
of that right is. 
Procedurally, there are evidential differences between the requirements of Article 8 of the 
ECHR, Article 3 of the CRC and domestic legislation which incorporates the paramountcy 
principle such as the Children Act 1989 (UK).2°5 One cannot simply argue that an 
outcome runs foul of the child's best interests and leave it at that. If a parent has argued 
that a particular order violates his or her Article 8 right, then the Court must justify such an 
204 johansen, above n 192, at [21 0]. 
205 Fortin, above n 132, 59. 
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infringement rather than simply disregard it as the CRC or the paramountcy principle 
would dictate. Article 8 appears to revive a concept of parental rights which up until now 
had been considered outdated.206 Fortin acknowledges that the outcome will often be the 
same under an Article 8 analysis and a paramountcy principle approach, but not always.207 
Substantively, Freeman and Fortin argue that by placing the child's interests within Article 
8(2), the Court has failed to recognise children as being individual players with rights of 
their own.208 In this manner, the Strasbourg Court has overlooked the European 
Convention's Preamble which affords "equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family". 209 
In Article 8 cases, the applicant will have to argue that the case falls within the scope of 
the right under Article 8(1) and that there has been interference of some sort. lt will then 
be for the state to show that the interference was justified. · In this second stage, the Court 
will examine the nature of the interference, the legal basis for the interference, the 
legitimate aims of the interference and the necessity of the interference in a democratic 
society.210 . Having conducted a thorough survey of relevance case law, Fortin has 
concluded that in cases where the interests of the parent and child conflict, the Court can 
restrict a parent's rights by reference to the child's best interests as long as (a) the parents 
have been fully involved in the decision making process; (b) the restriction is proportionate 
206 lbid 59. 
207 lbid 59. 
208 Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 14. Fortin, above n 132, 59. 
209 Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child', above n 117, 14. 
210 Buck, above n 109, 117-118. 
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to its legitimate aim; and (c) a fair balance has been struck between the competing interests 
(which may include third parties) of all concerned.211 
From the foregoing it is clear that when considering whether a genetic test should or 
should not be authorised, there is an underlying tension between the rights of the child, the 
rights and duties of family members and the responsibilities of the state (usually through 
the adoption of legislation). Similar tensions have emerged in custody/access cases and 
identity cases. 
7. Select custody/access cases 
Custody cases require an interpretation of the parents' right to respect for family life which 
is consistent with the best interests of the child as set out in the CRC and the Charter. Prior 
to the Child Convention, the best interests of the child was a relevant consideration in 
deciding Article 8 cases. In Hendriks v The Netherlands, 212 the applicant, a Dutch 
national, brought proceedings in the Dutch courts to gain legal access to his son. His ex-
wife refused to agree to any access. Mr Hendriks' claim turned on whether the relevant 
Dutch legislation was consistent with his Article 8 right to family and, if so, whether the 
national courts' interpretation of that law in his case was consistent with his right.213 Only 
the second issue will be examined here. The Dutch courts had consistently (and 
astonishingly) held that although the starting point was that contact with both parents was 
211 See Johansen above n 190 for the notion of fair balance; Hokkanen above n 201 at [58] where the 
Strasbourg Court held that in interpreting Article 8(2), the rights and freedoms of all concerned must be 
considered. 
212 Hendriks, above n 202. 
213 Section 161 (5) of the Dutch Civil Code provided that "The Court may on the application or request of 
both parents or of one of them make an arrangement for contact between the child and the parent to whom 
the custody has not or will not be awarded ... ". 
60 
preferred (as this would normally be in the child's best interests), when the custodial parent 
refused to co-operate then the best interests of the child favoured a denial of contact to the 
non-custodial parent. 
The Commission concluded that the applicant's right of access under Article 8(1) had been 
interfered with by the courts' interpretation of the provision but was justified under Article 
8(2) because the interference was in accordance with the law;214 had legitimate aims, 
being for the protection of the child;215 and was necessary in a democratic society for the 
protection of the health of the child. 216 The Commission pointed out that in the realm of 
custody law and the refusal of a right to access the legitimacy of an interference with 
Article 8 had always been interpreted so that the interests of the child predominated.217 In 
accepting that the denial of access was necessary, the Commission accorded the domestic 
courts' a significant margin of appreciation,218 and concluded that the protection of 
children was an important function of the law in a democratic society.2 19 The Commission 
held that whenever there was a conflict between the interests of the child and the parent in 
such cases, the child's interests had to prevail under Article 8(2).220 
214 Hendriks, above n 202, [113]-[114]. 
215 lbid [118]. 
216 lbid [125]. 
217 lbid [115]. 
218 lbid [118]. 
219 lbid [120]. 
220 lbid [124]. 
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lt is submitted that the Commission's decision reveals an institutional fidelity to the 
traditional welfare approach to best interests221 in two respects. First, the best interests of 
the child was not used to interpret the substantive right itself as set out in Article 8(1 ). 
Second, the European Commission in its Article 8(2) analysis was content to defer to the 
national courts' judgment on the best interests of the child, notwithstanding that those 
judgments comprised a wholesale substitution of their views for that of the child. Indeed, 
at no point in the appellate proceedings were the child's views on contact with his father 
expressly sought (although evidence was adduced to the effect that the child was content 
with his mother and step-father).222 
Post Child Convention, it appears that the Strasbourg Court's approach in custody cases 
remains unchanged. In Corguli.i v Cermany223 the European Court of Human Rights 
echoed the European Commission's views in Hendriks, holding that the principle of best 
interests of the child was relevant in terms of determining whether interference with Article 
8(1) is necessary in a democratic society but did not rely on the CRC for this conclusion. 
The Court did differ to the Hendriks Court by piercing the margin of appreciation and 
examining in detail how Germany had struck that balance. lt found unanimously that the 
child's interests had not been adequately taken into account in failing to grant custody to 
the child's father. 
221 Rather than using the child's best interests principle as an interpretative tool as now required under A1ticle 
3 of the Child Convention. 
222 The child had not seen his father since birth which at the time of the proceedings amounted to a period of 
4 years. 
223 Corgiilu v Germany [2004] ECHR 89 (ECtHR) ("Corgii/ii"). 
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2. Select identity cases 
The balancing of the child's best interests against the interests of his or her parents has 
been most recently discussed in the context of a child's right to know his or her genetic 
identity as protected by both Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC and Article 8 of the European 
Convention. In this regard, the child's right to know conflicts with many other rights: "one 
may think for instance, of the competing rights to autonomy and privacy of the mother, the 
father, the adoptive parents or the gamete donor".224 Some European nations permit 
immediate release of the information while other countries' laws provide it once the child 
has turned 18. Ultimately, the release of a child's genetic heritage is controlled according 
to the child's best interests.225 In addition to the Article 8(2) criteria for justified 
interference, it is argued in identity cases that respect for the right's inner core need also be 
maintained.226 A violation of a right's inner core would deprive the right of its very essence 
thereby emptying it of any content. Theoretical difficulties arise under this approach when 
two rights are brought into conflict with one another. Should each right threaten the 
respective inner core of the other, a Court can be tasked with an impossible balancing 
exercise.227 
224 Besson, above n 1 03. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid. In practice the inner core of the right is a malleable construct employed for no greater purpose than 
a reminder that rights are not to be traded away entirely by consequentialist limitations. It would be unlikely 
that a Court would conclude that two conflicting rights cannot be resolved without the inner core of one 
having to be disturbed. This would be contrary to the very structure of the European Convention which posits 
a hierarchy among the specific rights articulated in the text. 
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The Strasbourg Court in Odievre v France228 and }aggi v Switzerland229 has taken two 
different approaches to reconciling the inner conflict created by Article 8 in adoption cases 
which seeks to mediate a child's right to identity and the parent's right of confidentiality. In 
Odievre, the Court by 1 0 votes to 7, held that there had been no violation of Ms Odievre's 
right to respect for family life committed by the French practice of anonymous birth. The 
applicant, an adult at the time of the litigation, relied on the fact that France's practice of 
anonymous birth was unique amongst the European member state, arguing that a state 
could not be afforded a margin of appreciation in circumstances where, despite the best 
interests of the child being at stake, it maintained a different stance to the overwhelming 
consensus within the members states of the Council of Europe. 
The Court emphasised the many interests to be balanced: the child's right to know her 
identity; the birth mother's interest in remaining anonymous in order to protect her health; 
and the interests of the adoptive parents.230 lt reiterated that there were different ways in 
which a state could ensure respect for private life, whilst acknowledging that France was 
unique insofar as it sanctioned a permanent inability of an adopted child to establish his or 
her origins?3 1 The Court (in failing to mention the CRC) held that France had sufficiently 
balanced the competing interests and not breached Article 8 for two reasons. First, the 
applicant had been given access to non-identifying information about her natural mother. 
228 Odievre v France (2004) 38 EHRR 43 (ECtHR) ("Odievre"). 
229 jaggi v Switzerland 13 July 2006, ECHR, 58757/00 (ECtHR) ("jaggi"). 
230 Odievre above n 228, [44]. 
231 lbid [46]-[47]. 
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Second, new legislation permitted an independent body to waive confidentiality if the birth 
mother consented. 
The minority subjected the majority's analysis to robust criticism. By hiding behind the 
principle of margin of appreciation the dissenters argued that the Court had failed in its 
duty to review the way in which France had balanced the rights at stake. The practical 
effect of the decision was to confer an absolute right upon French birth mothers, in direct 
contravention of the child's right's inner core,232 which clearly included the right to an 
identity, an essential condition of the right to autonomy. Put simply, the majority had not 
attributed the proper scope to Article 8(1 ). Finally, the majority had failed to take into 
account important international conventions such as the Child Convention, in particular 
Article 7. 
In }aggi, the Court revised its approach taken in Odievre and found, by 5 votes to 2 that 
there had been a violation of Article 8. The Court held that the right to know one's 
parentage was part of the inner core of the right to private life233 and concluded that 
Switzerland had not balanced the relevant interests correctly thus breaching Article 8.234 
3. Synthesis of approaches 
Hendriks and Corgulu suggest that in custody and access cases, a child's best interests only 
remain relevant in terms of the Article 8(2) balancing test, rather than supplying the content 
of the substantive right. Yet the centre of gravity may be shifting. Certainly, in cases 
232 Odievre, above n 228, [11). 
233 Jaggi, above n 229, [3 7]. 
234 The minority disagreed on this point and did not think that the balancing had been so clearly wrong as to 
justify a finding of a violation: lbid, see Dissenting Opinion. 
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involving the right to know one's parentage (which comprise the more recent line of cases), 
the trend of the Strasbourg Court is to resolve the tension between a child and a parent's 
rights, by determining the right's so-called "inner core" under Article 8(1) and then in light 
of that, balancing the competing interests under Article 8(2). This may be the genesis of a 
more broadly based and pervasive shift in the European Court of Human Right's thinking 
on children's rights. Yet it is too soon to confidently tell. Somewhat surprisingly, the two 
bodies of case law, custody and access on the one hand and parentage on the other, do not 
talk to each other. Were they to do so, it is argued that the more "front-end" oriented 
analytical approach adopted in parentage cases should, for the reasons offered, become 
the general analytical blueprint for the Strasbourg Court in all matters concerning children. 
PART 4: THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO EXPRESS HIS OR HER VIEWS 
The Article 12 right of a child to express his or her views is one of the four core principles 
of the CRC and is sometimes referred to as the child's right to self-determination.235 It is 
generically referred to as the child's right to be heard.236 In any case where an.action may 
affect the child, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration with the 
child entitled to express his or her views in relation to the action in question. Much has 
been written on the balance to be struck between a child's best interests and a child's 
views.237 In many cases the child's wishes will conflict with what is ultimately perceived 
235 N Thomas and C O'Kane, 'When children's wishes clash with their 'best interests" (1998) 6 The 
International journal of Children's Rights 137. 
236 Human Rights Committee on the Rights of the Child, 'General Comment No. 12 (2009): the Right of the 
Child to be Heard (Un Doe CRC/C/GC/12)' (2009). 
237 See, e.g. Eekelaar, 'The Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: the Role of Dynamic Self-
Determinism' above n 39; Thomas and O'Kane, 'When children's wishes clash with their 'best interests" 
above n 235; Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117; Archard and Skivenes, above 
n 104. 
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as being in the child's best interests. The central question is how to resolve such a conflict. 
This requires consideration and reconciliation of, on the one hand, adult duties to promote 
the child's best interests and to listen and consider the child's wishes, and, on the other 
hand, a child's right to protection and participation.238 This part will examine the meaning 
afforded to Article 12 (or a domestic variation thereof) by the Strasbourg Court as well as in 
New Zealand domestic law, focussing primarily on its interaction with the principle of best 
interests. 
I. Reconciling a Child's Views and His or Her Best Interests 
Article 12 of the Child Convention grants those children who are capable of forming their 
own views, the right to freely express those views in matters affecting them. Those views 
are to be given due weight, in accordance with the child's age and maturity. The 
commitment is to hear the child and to give the views a weight proportionate to the child's 
maturity. Despite the absence of a clear hierarchy amongst the provisions in the Child 
Convention, Article 12 tends to be subjugated to the principle of best interests in domestic 
legal systems.239 
It has been argued that the qualification of "age and maturity" in Article 12 permits the 
child's views to be ultimately disregarded or more easily outweighed by other 
considerations.240 Here, the concern is that the right to express one's views is hollow if 
those views can be simply disregarded by conclusory resort to the child's "best 
238 Thomas and 0' Kane, 'When children's wishes clash with their 'best interests" above n 235, 139. 
239 Archard and Skivenes, above n 104, 2. 
240 Thomas and O'Kane, 'When children's wishes clash with their 'best interests" above n 235, 138. 
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i nterests".241 As we have seen in the earlier part on competence, this situation is 
exacerbated in the case of a competent child whose views are disregarded in the name of 
best interests. Framing the issue in this way exposes the close relationship that the child's 
best interests and respect for the child's views has in practice. Freeman suggests that the 
answer is one of balancing autonomy and best interests.242 
Eekelaar provides a model of how to achieve such a balance called dynamic self-
determinism.243 His model restructures the concept of best interests so as to coalesce with 
the proposition that children are rights-holders. He notes that the best interests principle is 
usually employed in a process of "objectivisation" whereby the decision-maker draws on 
beliefs as to what is in the child's best interests such as expert evidence and his or her own 
social beliefs.244 The reliability of such determinations is uncertain.245 Eekelaar's 
alternative is to eschew reliance on the decision maker's beliefs of the child's best interests 
on a largely predictive basis and instead defer a final determination by the decision maker 
until the child has been observed in his or her own "reasonably secure" environment.246 
As the child develops, s/he is encouraged to draw on these influences so as to ultimately 
contribute to the outcome: "the very fact that the outcome has been, at least partly, 
determined by the child is taken to demonstrate that the outcome is in the child's best 
241 Freeman, 'Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child' above n 117, 6. 
242 lbid 6. 
243 Eekelaar, 'The Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: the Role of Dynamic Self-Determinism' above 
n 39. 
244 lbid, 46- 47. 
245 lbid, 47. 
246 lbid, 48. 
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interests".247 Eekelaar acknowledges that such a result would be a strain on resources, but 
only in the "most conflicted of cases".248 The passive role this process accords to the child 
has been criticised for its failure to emphasise the child's right to participate and enter into 
a process of dialogue with the adults involved.249 Where genetic testing is concerned, 
genetic counselling may fulfil! the role of "dynamic self-determinism" and simultaneously 
address the criticism regarding a child's participation (or lack thereof) in the process.250 
A common theme regarding the best interests of the child, the child's views, and medical 
decision making, is the tendency to collapse the questions of the child's capacity and his/ 
her best interests into one enquiry.251 In this way, a child's capacity is determined by 
reference to an assessment of the child's best interests: if the child's views conflict with his 
or her best interests, this often leads to a conclusion that the child does not have the 
capacity to make the decision at all.252 The discussion in section two of this paper should. 
be sufficient to illustrate the problems in such an approach. Competent children, it has 
247 lbid, 47-48. 
248 lbid, 48. 
249 Thomas and O'Kane, 'When children's wishes clash with their 'best interests" above n 235, 141. 
250 Genetic counselling has been defined as "a communication process dealing with the human problems 
associated with the occurrence, or the risk of occurrence, of a genetic disorder in a family": A Clarke, The 
Genetic Testing of Children (Bios scientific publishers, Oxford 1998). The main aim of genetic counselling is 
to personalise appropriate genetic information about the risk or potential for disease The central elements 
include risk assessment, information-giving, decision making and assessment of psychological coping 
processes. Generally, a consultation will include the nature of the disorder, the family history and an 
assessment of the individual. lt is to be distinguished from a medical consultation in its emphasis on 
knowledge. lt does not focus on the "is" but on the "might be": refer C Evans and B Biesecker, Genetic 
Counselling: a Psychological Conversation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006). 
251 This approach is seen in the Oviedo Convention, above n 7, which also appears to collapse the issue of 
capacity and best interests at the first stage, with benefit coming in at the second stage: see Section 3. 
252 A further distinction is often overlooked in medical decision making where the question of what is 
medically best for the child (an empirical issue) is typically equated to the child's best interests (a more 
complex normative issue): Archard and Skivenes, above n 104, 9. 
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been argued, should be able to make decisions with which others disagree and perceive to 
be against their best interests. Certainly, a child's maturity or capacity should be decided 
independently of an evaluation of the child's views. However and consistently with 
Eekelaar's characterisation of a child's competence, the perceived wrongness of a child's 
views (or life goals) can be evidence that the child is not competent.253 
11. The Strasbourg Court and Article 12 of the CRC 
The Strasbourg Court has not, as it has done with the principle of best interests, read in the 
requirement of respecting the child's views into the ECHR. In some cases, affording the 
child's views with more respect may have led to a different (and preferable) result.254 Such 
an approach may be reflective of the differing status of best interests and the child's views, 
the latter not always finding expression in domestic law. 
However, in more recent case law, the Strasbourg Court has recognised that the child's 
wishes can be relevant in determining whether measures adopted by the state are 
"necessary" under Article 8(2).255 In L v Finland two children, P and S were placed into a 
foster home by the state. Through a series of official decisions the state adopted severe 
restrictions on the applicants' (father and grandfather) access to the two children. The 
initial taking into care and the subsequent orders made in relation to their care, namely 
that P and S remain in a foster home and see their parents a limited number of times a year 
253 lbid, 1 0. 
254 See e.g. Nielsen v Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175 (ECtHR). Here the placement of a 12 year old in a 
closed psychiatric ward, at his mother's request and against his express wishes and the fact that he did not 
suffer a mental illness, was not held to have breached Article 5 (right to liberty and security) of the ECHR. 
Note that this decision was decided prior to the CRC coming into force. 
255 L v Finland (2001) 31 EHRR 30 (ECtHR) at [125]. 
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were claimed to be breaches of the applicants' Article 8 right. The relevant Finnish 
legislation recognised the importance of ascertaining the child's views when determining 
access and custody affecting that child. P and S did not want more regular access to the 
father-applicant, and wanted no access with their grandfather. The Strasbourg Court held 
that the violation of the applicants' Article 8 rights (which was conceded by Finland) was 
justifiable under Article 8(2) as they were in accordance with the law and were necessary 
in light of the facts of the case, including the children's views. 
Ill. New Zealand and the Child's Wishes 
New Zealand expressly recognises the relevance of a child's views. However, under s 6 of 
the COCA, this is limited to proceedings concerning guardianship, custody, and the child's 
property. Section 6 provides that in such proceedings, a child has to be given a reasonable 
opportunity to express his or views and that any views mu.st be taken into account. The 
section, contrary to Article 12 of the Child Convention, is silent as to the weight to be 
afforded to the child's views. 
There is no provision which sets out the child's right to express his or her views in other 
contexts. Yet this does not oust the legal obligation to obtain the child's views in medical 
decision making where guardianship is not at issue. First, the construction of s 16 
"exercise of guardianship" provides that medical treatment decisions for children unable to 
consent themselves are to be determined "for or with the child". Second, the rights 
provided to health consumers in the Code expressly include a right to effective 
communication. Finally, the common law recognises the right of a child to express his or 
her views, although there are few cases where the child's views deviate significantly from 
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his/her best interests in a medical context.256 One case concerned the genetic testing for 
parentage purposes of an eight year old.257 The applicant in the Family Court proceedings 
alleged he was the father and applied for a genetic test to be carried out. Genetic testing 
to determine parentage can be ordered by the Court pursuant to s 54 of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1950. The child was vehemently opposed to the testing. The proceedings 
engaged s 6 of the COCA as the guardianship of the child was ultimately at in issue. On 
appeal against the Family Court's decision ordering the test, the High Court held that the 
age and maturity of the child were factors (amongst others) relevant to the weight to be 
given to the child's views, just as with any other evidence before the Court. However, 
Heath J agreed with prior case law258 that the proper construction of s 6(2) did not 
demand that a child's views expressed under s 6 be determinative. Such a conclusion 
would run counter to the overarching obligation of the Court under s 4 to act in the child's. 
best interests. Despite the child's views, the Court concluded that the parentage test was in 
the best interests of the child.259 
256 lt is worth mentioning that in a case involving the medical treatment to be given to a very sick seven year 
old, the child's views were not expressly mentioned. A lawyer for the child was appointed and cross 
examined the doctors who were defending the proposed treatment but at no point were the child's views 
discussed. In that case, a genetic test (for diagnostic purposes) was recommended if the parents deemed it 
appropriate with no mention of the child. See Waikato District Health Board v F above n 71. 
257 Fletcher v Blackburn [2009] NZFLR 354 (High Court). 
258 C v 5 [2006] 3 NZLR 420 (HC). 
259 The Court allowed the appeal on the grounds that the Family Court had "gone too far" by, in response to 
the child's mother being consistently uncooperative, immediately placing the child under the guardianship of 
the Court for the purposes of the genetic test being carried out. The Family Court should have granted the 
mother one last chance to arrange for the test to be carried out, thereby avoiding such a coercive 
environment for the child: Fletcher v Blackburn above n 257, [71 J -[77}. 
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PART 5: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
For all its perceived flaws, none of which this paper regards as fatal, the best interests of the 
child, as provided for in the Child Convention is a general interpretative principle of 
international law which should be taken into account in all matters concerning children. 
The right of a child to express his or her views has not reached such a status but remains 
an essential consideration in determining a child's best interests. 
The Strasbourg Court's general approach to the best interests of the child in Article 8 cases 
cannot be described as inconsistent with the Child Convention or placing a strain on that 
Convention's provisions. The Strasbourg Court's approach shows an awareness of the 
principles of the CRC and a strong effort to take them into account. The ECHR itself does 
not incorporate any specific provisions concerning children and was not designed to 
manage children's claims.260 To a degree, the Strasbourg Court's approach is an example 
of the recognition in practice of the interdependence and interrelatedness of human 
rights.261 In applying the Convention before them, a regional human rights' court cannot 
disregard other relevant human rights norms. In this way, the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
reflects an understanding of the need for children to have an independent status and 
occasionally require protection against their parents, a paradigm shift crystallised by the 
CRC.262 
26° Fortin, above n 132, 53. 
261 The UN has declared that all human rights, including those espoused by the CRC are interdependent, 
indivisible, and interrelated. For an article which touches on whether this is an apt trilogy for describing 
human rights see: DJ Whelan, 'Untangling the Indivisibility, Interdependence, and Interrelatedness of Human 
Rights' Economic Working Paper Series <http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/7.pdf> accessed 2 July 2009. 
262 Fortin, above n 132,57. 
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Yet the Court cannot be lauded for offering something akin to "mutual support" to the CRC. 
This would require the Court to undergo a jurisprudential sea-change in two respects. 
First, express recognition would have to be given to the applicability of the principle of 
best interests in all matters involving children. Second, the principle would need to be 
employed at an earlier stage in the judicial analysis in defining the content and inner core 
of the specific Article 8 right said, by the relevant adult applicant to have been infringed. 
Mutual support would only be reached through a "front-end" definition of the Article 8 
substantive right. 
What lessons does this yield for the best interests versus benefit debate in New Zealand, 
which is this paper's central concern? On a specific level, the European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence does not translate cleanly into New Zealand's constitutional 
framework and sits awkwardly with its jurisprudential machinery. The ability of the 
Strasbourg Court to declare violations of rights by primary legislation is not matched by the 
weaker interpretative powers afforded to New Zealand judges under ss 4 to 6 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.263 In any event, the NZBORA contains no broad 
comparator to Article 8. If an Article 8 analysis is to inform the New Zealand debate, it 
must do so in a less direct manner. At this broader level, the preceding sketch of the 
European position should demonstrate four points. First, the notion of best interests has an 
impressive historical pedigree. Judges are familiar with it. While they may not always 
imbue it with the rigour this paper argues it deserves, courts have in practice managed to 
give meaningful recognition to the principle in difficult cases. Second, obtaining the views 
of the child himself or herself is an indispensable aspect of ascertaining what is in that 
263 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("NZBORA"). 
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child's best interests. Third, the optimising nature of best interests and considering a child's 
views relative to that child's level of understanding has the capacity to sit comfortably 
alongside a proportionality analysis which supplies the primary machinery for human 
rights adjudication. Finally, an acknowledgement of children as autonomous beings and a 
commitment to the provisions of the CRC must surely lead, when a child's interests are 
brought into conflict with those of an adult or other third party, to those of the former 
providing the sole analytical focal point for a judge charged with resolving any conflict. 
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SECTION THREE: THE CONCEPT OF "BENEFIT" 
This section will explore the adoption of the expression benefit in international law. lt will 
draw on the High Court of Australian decision in Marion 1S Case to identify the distinction 
between best interests and benefit. The underlying question is whether, in light of the 
preceding discussion on the principle of best interests, the notion of "benefit" and "best 
interests" are synonymous and, if not, what are the material differences. 
PART 1: THE USE OF BENEFIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
I. The Use of Benefit for Medical Procedures Generally 
In international law, the requirement of free and informed consent for medical procedures 
is arguably universal. lt is contained in all international conventions relevant to medical 
interventions, medical experimentation and the collection of genetic data.264 However, for 
persons unable to consent, the language defining the scope of a third party's authority to 
consent to a specific medical intervention is inconsistent. 
The Oviedo Convention requires that if the person is unable to consent, then an 
intervention may only be carried out for his or her direct benefit. Within the Oviedo 
Convention itself, there are two standards of benefit: in an emergency benefit is not 
qualified by "direct",265 whereas in non-emergency situations it is.266 lt is suggested that 
the time constraints implicit in emergency situations warrant a lower threshold of benefit. 
264 See Article 5 of the Oviedo Convention, above n 7; Article 5(b) of the UDHGHR (Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights) above n 29; Article 6 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights 2005 (Adopted by UNESCO on 19 October 2005) ("UDBHR/'); Article 2(iii) of the 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 2003 (Adopted by UNESCO on 16 October 2003). 
265 Oviedo Convention, above n 7, Article 8 "Emergency Situation". 
266 Oviedo Convention, above n 7, Article 6 "Protection of persons not able to consent". 
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Hence, the expression "direct" serves to make the test in non-emergency situations 
relatively more onerous. 
The Explanatory Report to the Oviedo Convention does not elaborate on the meaning of 
the term "benefit".267 However, it does state that in agreeing on the wording of Article 6, 
the purpose was not to provide a single test on what amounted to a competent individual, 
but to protect persons unable to consent. Therefore, the Convention refers to the domestic 
law of the country requiring:268 
each country to determine, in its own way, whether or not persons are capable of 
consenting to an intervention and taking account of the need to deprive persons of 
their capacity for autonomy only where it is necessary in their best interests. 
[Emphasis added] 
The inclusion of the italicised phrase has the effect of declaring that for all persons, of 
whom children necessarily form a constituent group, their best interests may lead to a 
determination that they do not have capacity and in that event what is in their direct 
benefit will prescribe the limits of what a person can consent to on their behalf. On this 
view, "best interests" and "benefit" are accorded two distinct roles. This is an unusual 
juxtaposition of the two concepts. The specific role afforded to "best interests" in this 
instrument illustrates the ease with which capacity and best interests can be collapsed into 
one single issue; a danger this paper has already cautioned against.269 Medical law is 
often careful to make the distinction The standard of "best interests" is not applicable 
when determining whether a person is capable of consent. Rather, having established that 
267 Council of Europe, 'Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine' (1996) 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/164.htm> accessed 2 July 2009. 
268 lbid, (accessed 2 July 2009), [42]. 
269 See Section 2, Part 4 on the child's views. 
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the person is not competent, it operates to define the circumstances in which the particular 
medical intervention can proceed.270 Against this background the phrase "deprivation of 
autonomy in one's best interests" is not a correct characterisation of how an individual's 
capacity is and should be determined. Rather, one must decide whether the person 
possesses the necessary ability to make a free and informed decision, appreciating the 
nature of what consent entails. If the answer is no, then one must turn to whether or not 
the consent of a third party should be provided on the incapable person's behalf. lt is at 
this point that either the person's "best interests" or their "direct benefit" become relevant. 
The different roles accorded to the two concepts by the Oviedo Convention suggests its 
signatories recognised a material difference between them. Regrettably, the Explanatory 
Note offers no indication of what those differences were. 
By contrast to the Oviedo Convention both the UDBHR271 and the UDHGHR272 limit a 
third party's consent by the best interests of the person concerned. The UDHGHR states 
that when a person is unable to consent, consent shall be obtained in accordance with the 
law of the country, guided by the person's best interests. Here, the expression "guided by 
the person's best interests", seems only to govern the obtaining of consent (and not the 
establishment of capacity). The UDBHR expressly acknowledges that the person who is 
not capable of providing consent should be involved in the decision making process. 
270 Herring, above n 79, 161-165. 
271 Article 7. 
272 Article S(b). 
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11. The Use of Benefit for Genetic Testing Specifically 
The Genetic Testing Protocol/73 which opened for signature on the 27 November 2008 for 
the purposes of clarifying obligations under the Oviedo Convention with respect to genetic 
testing, adds an additional gloss to the direct benefit test. The Protocol provides that 
genetic testing can only be undertaken for health purposes if of direct benefit to the person 
tested. This suggests a dual legal regime depending on whether the test is or is not for 
health purposes; direct benefit if so; some unarticulated standard (if any) if not. Ascribing a 
broad definition to "health" would remove much of the significance of this distinction.274 
What is meant by health is neither defined nor addressed in the Explanatory Report. 
Nevertheless, the World Health Organisation offers a definition of health which is very 
broad:275 
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity. 
If this is the operative definition, then most genetic tests could fall within it. Indeed, the 
Genetic Testing Protocol acknowledges that predictive testing can be carried out for health 
purposes and specifically envisages the following types of tests: tests predictive of a 
monogenic disease; tests serving to detect a genetic predisposition or genetic susceptibility 
to a disease; and tests serving to identify the subject as a healthy carrier of a gene 
responsible for a disease.276 
273 Genetic Testing Protocol, above n 7. 
274 If "health" were defined broadly such that all genetic testing could be deemed for health purposes, the 
direct benefit test would apply in every case with no content given to the category of cases to which the 
unarticulated criteria would apply. 
275 World Health Organization, 'WHO Definition of Health' (<http://www.who.int/about/definition/en/ 
print.html> accessed 1 July 2009. 
276 Article 8. 
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The Protocol establishes an exception to the general rule in the Oviedo Convention that an 
intervention may only be for a person's direct benefit2 77 by providing for the possibility of 
"tests for the benefit of family members" in Article 13. Two points emerge from this 
exception. First, the mere fact that such testing is expressed as a derogation to the general 
rule of "direct benefit" suggests that circumstances will arise in which testing which is not 
of direct medical benefit to the child tested is nevertheless highly desirable. Second and 
relatedly, the direct benefit test comprises a more truncated inquiry than that encapsulated 
by a wider ranging best interests test. 
Indeed, Article 13 defines the exception according to six criteria. First the purpose of the 
test must be to allow the family member to make an informed reproductive choice or 
obtain a preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic benefit that has been independently 
evaluated as important for their health. Second, the benefit to that family member must be 
solely obtainable through such a test. Third, the risk and burden of the test must be 
minimal for the person tested. Fourth, the expected benefit must have been 
"independently evaluated as substantially outweighing the risk for private life that may 
arise from the collection, processing or communication of the results of the test". Fifth, the 
person authorised to provide consent on behalf of the person unable to has done so. 
Finally, the person unable to consent is, in proportion with his or her capacity to 
understand and degree of maturity, to take part in the authorisation procedure and ifs/he 
objects, the testing shall not proceed. Plainly, the focus of this exception is not the best 
interests of the child tested. Yet the breadth of the inquiry shares analogues with the best 
277 Article 6(1) of the Oviedo Convention, above n 7. See also Article 10 of the Genetic Testing Protocol, 
above n 7. 
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interests test. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of situations in which the criteria governing 
the exception lead to an outcome that is in the tested child's best interests. Were direct 
benefit the sole test governing consent, genetic testing would be foreclosed in such cases. 
Three examples can be offered.278 
Lily is seven. She has a cancer which is thought to have a genetic basis. She is currently in 
remission. Lily is not competent to consent. The results of any genetic test performed on 
her may not change the way in which her health is managed. Howeve0 the results of the 
test could help diagnose other members of her family by comparing their genetic makeup 
with hers and the particular mutation thought to be the source of the cancer.279 H the 
mutation is identified in her sister or parents/ they can be subject to much higher scrutiny 
and undergo regular tests if necessary.280 Such scrutiny could be life saving. Such a test is 
not to Lily's //direct benefit// since she is in remission. Lily has been explained the situation 
278 These are broadly drawn from the examples provided in the Explanatory Report to the Genetic Testing 
Protocol: see Council of Europe, 'Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes CETS No 23' <http:// 
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/203.htm> accessed 2 April 2009, [1 06]-[1 08]. 
279 Here the genetic test of the child is used to highlight the particular mutation in a known gene leading to 
the cancer. Once identified, the mutation can be used as either a pre-symptomatic or diagnostic tool for 
other members of Lucy's family. Regarding the former, since Lucy is manifesting the cancer as a child, one 
would assume incomplete penetrance: see Section 1. Therefore, other factors (e.g. environment) may result 
in a member of Lucy's family manifesting the disease much later despite inheriting the same mutation. In 
such cases, the mutation in question may be inherited in an apparent autosomal dominant manner (thus 
requiring only a single mutation in one gene copy). However, (and more commonly) to become 
symptomatic one requires "two hits" in the gene in question. This means that each copy of the gene has a 
mutation: one hit (mutation) is inherited, the other hit is a somatic (non-sex cell) mutation which has 
occurred during the person's life. An example of this type of cancer is hereditary retinoblastoma, a cancer of 
the retina. Here, a person inherits one mutation and develops the second mutation during his or her life 
time, thereby resulting in cancer. Thanks to Associate Professor Don Love of the University of Auckland 
Medical School, Auckland New Zealand, for his lucid explanation of how these cancers work on a genetic 
level and the specific example of hereditary retinoblastoma. 
280 See the case example of the APC gene causing familial adenomatous polyposis and options for 
management should the mutation be discovered: A Read and D Donnai, New Clinical Genetics (Scion 
Publishing Ltd, Bloxham 2007) 316. 
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as fully as possible given her age, in language she can understand. She has told her parents 
and her doctor that she wants to be tested to //help her sister and Mummy and Daddy 1'. In 
these circumstances it could be cogently argued that is in Lily's best interests to be tested: it 
is in line with her views; the test is non-invasive; and it may help preserve her family 
environment by potentially saving another member of her family. 
A/do is 10. He has been diagnosed with cystic fibrosis without reliance on a genetic test. 
Cystic fibrosis can be caused by many different mutations and could have been inherited 
by A/do's parents or perhaps developed independently. Testing A/do and his parents will 
assist his parents in establishing whether they are carriers of the mutation and have a risk of 
passing it on to future children, or not. A/do has been explained the situation in language 
he can understand. He has been deemed not competent to consent to a test. Howevet~ 
A/do has said that he is happy to be tested so that mum and dad can make a decision to 
have another baby. He would like a brother or sister. Testing is not to A/do's direct or 
present benefit as he has already been diagnosed and his treatment plan developed. 
However, a test could be in his best interests: A/do would like the test to help his family; 
giving effect to A/do's views is meaningful for his autonomy and how he perceives himself 
as part of the family unit; the test is non-invasive; there is a small possibility that identifying 
the particular mutation may assist A/do in the future (development of gene therapy). 
]essica is six years old. She is a healthy child. Her older sister has a rare genetic disorder 
for which the mutation has not been identified. The only current way for identifying the 
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disorder is by using a method called genetic linkage.281 In order to identify a genetic 
mutation, genetic tests are obtained from members of the family, healthy or not. 
Identification of the mutation may assist in the treatrnent of ]essica 's sister. jessica has been 
found incapable of providing consent to a test. The test does not seem to be of any direct 
benefit to ]essica as she is currently healthy. ]essica understands that her sister is not well 
and understands that a test could help her. This test could be argued to be in jessica's best 
interests because: she wants the test to help her sister; the test is non-invasive; the test 
could assist her in the future as she may in fact be a carrier of the mutation; the results 
could help save her sister and preserve her family unit. 
PART 2: THE ADOPTION OF "THERAPEUTIC" BENEFIT AS A LIMIT ON 
PARENTAL POWER IN DOMESTIC LAW 
At a domestic law level, the High Court of Australia has offered valuable comment on the 
interrelationship between best interests and benefit. In Marion's Case,282 the High Court of 
Australia was faced with whether or not a parent could legally consent, without a court 
order, to the sterilisation of an intellectually disabled child. Two related issues arose from 
that central question. First, who was the repository of the power to consent on the 
incapable/incompetent child's behalf. Second, what legal standard governed the 
parameters of that consent. The majority composed of Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ held that the relevant limit on parental authority to consent was best interests. 
281 Linkage refers to the concept of genes being "linked" whereby loci that are close together on a 
chromosome tend to be inherited together. The extent of the tendency of two loci to be inherited together 
can be observed in a family group and used to determine the distance between the two loci measured. See 
more generally- Read and Donnai, above n 280, Chapter 9. 
282 Marion's Case above n 14. 
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However, given the special considerations pertaining to sterilisation, the majority 
concluded that the repository of the power to consent to sterilisation was the Court alone. 
They proposed three reasons for that view.283 First, sterilisation required invasive, 
irreversible and major surgery.284 Second, there was a significant risk of making the wrong 
decision about either the child's present or future capacity to consent or what was in the 
child's best interests.285 Third, the consequences of a wrongful authorisation of sterilisation 
were grave.286 That gravity lay in the removal of the child's reproductive ability and in the 
violation of one's body contrary to one's wishes or best interests .. Such a violation could 
lead to serious social and psychological issues and impact on the child's sense of identity, 
social place and self-esteem. The Court were also uneasy with the far-reaching 
repercussions of a general rule which, in effect, permitted guardians to consent to any type 
of medical treatment.2B7 
On analysis, the majority's approach comprised a resounding endorsement of the 
continued applicability of the best interests standard. Their only deviation from perceived 
orthodoxy lay in their requirement that the Court be the sole arbiter of best interests in 
certain special cases. This stemmed from an understandable concern at the only check on 
the parent's consent to a significant procedure being the medical practitioner performing it. 
283 lbid [48] of the majority decision. 
284 lbid [49] of the majority decision. 
285 lbid [49] of the majority decision. 
286 lbid [51] of the majority's decision. 
287 lbid [52] of the majority's decision. 
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However, it is the manner in which Brennan j, in dissent, responded to that same concern 
which is most relevant for present purposes. Taking care to confine his analysis to the 
sterilisation context with which the Court was solely concerned, His Honour considered 
the best interests test to be deficient. Fundamentally, it offered no hierarchy of values 
which might guide the discretionary power to authorize the medical procedure at issue.288 
The absence of clear guidelines or rules had a number of undesirable consequences. The 
power to consent was reduced to an unexaminable discretion which merely reflected the 
subjective views of the person in whom the power to consent ultimately resided. Courts 
became entirely dependent upon experts supplying a dossier of fact and opinion without 
reference to any check-list of legal requirements. A complex moral and social question 
would be transformed into a question of fact. 
His Honour's alternative was to replace the best interests test with a "clearer" rule based on 
a distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions. Where medical 
treatment was for a therapeutic purpose, parental consent would be effective without Court 
involvement. Where medical treatment was non-therapeutic, the Court would be required 
to undertake a balancing act, weighing the value of the non-therapeutic purpose against 
the invasion of the child's personal integrity. The language of "best interests" was 
noticeably absent at all stages of the inquiry. 
Acknowledging that there might be factual differences as to whether a procedure was 
therapeutic or non-therapeutic, His Honour nevertheless considered the distinction to be 
clear:289 
288 lbid [14] per Brennan J. 
289 lbid [11] per Brennan J. 
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1 would define treatment (including surgery) as therapeutic when it is administered 
for the chief purpose of preventing, removing or ameliorating a cosmetic deformity, 
a pathological condition or a psychiatric disorder, provided the treatment is 
appropriate for and proportionate to the purpose for which it is administered. "Non-
therapeutic" medical treatment is descriptive of treatment which is inappropriate or 
disproportionate having regard to the cosmetic deformity, pathological condition or 
psychiatric disorder for which the treatment is administered and of treatment which 
is administered chiefly for other purposes. 
On this formulation, "therapeutic treatment" captures a particular species of medical 
benefit. That is seemingly confirmed by His Honour's earlier statement that therapeutic 
sterilisation is justified "by the need to maintain to the maximum extent or to enhance the 
child's natural physical and mental attributes//. 290 Implicit in this comment is a suggestion 
that each case will be self-defining by reference to a cursory determination of medical 
benefit. However, the inclusion of the language of proportionality in the first-quoted 
passage suggests that therapeutic and non-therapeutic are merely synonyms for situations 
where the balance of medical benefits and unarticulated costs (or harm) are respectively 
positive and negative. This difference in approach is more than semantic. Indeed, it 
reveals a critical difference between a benefit test and a best interests test. 
PART 3: ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BEST INTERESTS AND 
BENEFIT 
This paper suggests that there are four main differences between a best interests test and a 
benefit test. 
First, as has already been outlined, the qualification of "interests" by the adjective "best" 
implies an optimal outcome that those interests must achieve from the child's point of 
view. Translated into a medical context, both the procedure and the refusal of the 
29o !bid [20] per Brennan J [Emphasis Added.] 
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procedure must be considered, the detriment and benefit of each calculated, and the 
option which generates the greater balance of benefits over detriments undertaken. A 
crude benefit test requires no such optimality. That the particular test yields a (medical) 
benefit is, in principle, sufficient justification for a parent to provide consent, irrespective 
of the broader costs that procedure might engender or the superior benefits that the refusal 
of consent might generate. 
Viewed in this way, the benefit test gives no expression to questions of balance or 
optimisation of the options at hand. Yet, adoption of the more balance-oriented 
interpretation of Brennan J's dictum (which determines whether a purpose is therapeutic or 
non-therapeutic), though removing one difference between best interests and benefits, 
highlights a second difference between the two concepts: benefit is typically equated with 
medical benefit. By contrast, the interests captured by a best interests test, as Eekelaar has 
demonstrated,291 are not so tightly circumscribed. Physical, emotional, intellectual and 
autonomy interests are all potentially at play. The result is a much wider ran~ing inquiry 
than the benefit test would permit. Advocates of the benefit test, Brennan J included, cite 
its relative simplicity as a reason for it to be preferred. However, one must ask whether a 
narrower inquiry is a worthwhile price for expediency. 
The normative questions raised in the preceding two paragraphs can be tested by 
considering two questions. First, should parents be permitted to consent to a procedure 
which entails no direct medical benefit to their child? Second, should parents be permitted 
to refuse consent to a procedure which is of direct medical benefit to the child? 
291 See Section 2, Part 2(11) for a discussion concerning the indeterminacy of the best interests principle. 
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As to the first point, the three examples postulated above, should be sufficient to 
demonstrate the harm that can be done to the child's autonomy, family dynamic and 
emotional state by an absolute prohibition on the provision of consent to genetic testing 
which would assist others while being medically neutral in respect of the child tested. In 
the genetic testing environment, the importance of the family unit and the psychological 
well being of the child and the family as a whole cannot be understated. These interests 
must surely be brought to bear in our analysis of whether the procedure should 
nevertheless be permitted. 
Equally, it is possible to conceive of situations in which non-medical interests might 
overwhelmingly favour the refusal of consent to a procedure of medical benefit to the 
child. Thorny examples feature in the English case law. A child refusing a life-saving heart 
transplant for firmly held religious views.292 Another child refusing a blood transfusion for 
similar reasons.293 In the genetic testing context, the presence of the APOE4 gene has 
been proven to demonstrate a higher risk of developing Alzheimer's disease. Taken 
together with the recent discovery of three new gene links to Alzheimer's,294 there is a real 
possibility that treatments directed at these specific genes could be developed in order to 
ameliorate the effects of Alzheimer's thereby engendering a medical benefit. Yet a child 
aged 12 may not wish to be tested for such genes. Knowing that their discovery indicates a 
strong likelihood of developing a particularly debilitating disease later in life, the child may 
292 Re M (A Child) (Medical Treatment: Consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097 (HC) (15 year old). 
293 See Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) above n 91 (15 vear old); ReP (medical treatment: 
best interests) above n 91 (16 year old). ' 
294 N Wade, 'Three Genetic Variants Are Found to be Linked to Alzheimer's' The New York Times (New York 7 
September 2009) A4. 
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wish to remain ignorant of her fate, irrespective of any attendant medical benefits that early 
intervention may generate. We might legitimately differ on whether consent should be 
granted or withheld in such circumstances. Yet a benefit test precludes this debate from 
ever occurring. Rather, medical benefit is arbitrarily declared to be the sole principle 
around which parental consent is calibrated. 
Third, aside of the use of the adjective "best", there is an additional linguistic difference in 
the use of "interests" versus "benefit". The Oxford dictionary defines "interest" as "the 
advantage or benefit of a person or group".295 Plainly interest and benefit are capable of 
amounting to the same thing. Yet there is a meaningful difference between the two. Talk of 
"interests" as opposed to "benefits" engages an entire language of rights. A language 
which instantly evokes the notion of dignity and accords more closely with the child as 
autonomous being and right-bearer. 
The final difference lies in the procedural nature of each test. Best interests and benefit 
affect more than the substantive outcome. Procedurally, they comprise different means of 
involving children in the decision making process. Benefit absolutely forecloses any 
consideration of a child's views: s/he plays no role in the ultimate outcome as there is no 
reason for those views to be obtained. Best interests, by contrast, reverses both of these 
conclusions: a child's autonomy is a relevant factor to be thrown into the analytical mix; 
his/her views must accordingly be sought. The notion of balance and proportionality 
which best interests automatically captures provides an ideal vehicle through which 
295 Soanes and Stevenson (eds), above n 125. 
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involvement in the decision making process relative to a child's understanding can be 
adequately reconciled. 
This paper has already argued that the criticisms levelled at best interests are overstated. 
Moreover, those who advance such criticisms fail to offer a superior alternative in its place. 
Consideration of the "benefit" standard demonstrates that it is just as vulnerable to a charge 
of opacity as the best interests test. While we have seen that "benefit" has been limited to 
medical benefit there is no logical reason why this should be so. Indeed, the report of the 
HGRP suggests "benefit" to be a concept capable of transcending overt clinical benefit.296 
One might inquire whether such a broad a view of benefit is simply best interests under 
another name. If this were to be so, incompetent children could be subjected to significant 
medical procedures based on a vague notion of "benefit" without the attendant safeguards 
that a best interest test involves: a consideration of detriment; the requirement for 
optimality; engaging the child in the process; and the familiar rights tradition best interests 
engages with. The normative justification for such an approach is unclear. Consent to a 
procedure demonstrated and accepted to be in the child's best interests is self-justifying. 
Consent to a procedure established to merely generate a benetlt is less so. 
Concerns at the opacity of "best interests" can be met by requiring courts who are the 
ultimate arbiters of that question to substantiate their conclusion and articulate their 
reasoning as fully and transparently as possible. The response might be that in practice, 
few cases ever go to court. Central to the HGRP's recommendation for the adoption of 
"benefit" is the absence of practical legal interventions to prevent parents from making 
296 HGRP, above n 4, 274. 
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medical decisions which are not in their child's best interests. This concern gains little 
traction when dealing specifically with genetic testing. The requirement for genetic 
counselling prior to the undertaking of a genetic test ensures that a greater number of 
objective "outsiders" are aware and involved in the decision making process prior to the 
test taking place. There is a greater likelihood of court assistance being sought to 
determine the overriding legal issue. As the following section will demonstrate, a best 
interests test is more likely to uphold the child's dignity in such situations. 
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SECTION FOUR: THE DIGNITY OF THE CHILD 
Dignity is trendy. In the area of bioethics, it has consistently attracted much legal 
scholarship.297 lt is heavily relied on in international politics and has been showered more 
attention in recent times by philosophers and political theorists.298 lt is said to be a 
common thread which underpins the fundamental values of democracy, citizenship and 
participation.299 However, there seems to be little evidence that such attention has had 
much, if any, effect on the legal and judicial meanings afforded to the concept.300 This ·is 
particularly evident in New Zealand where dignity is seldom relied on in any substantive 
capacity. When it comes to international human rights law, dignity is ubiquitous and as a 
concept, is notoriously hard to pin down. Some authors adopt it as the foundational 
concept of all human rights, that sacred elixir upon which all human rights are weaned. 
Others, adopt dignity as an interpretative principle of human rights law. A further account 
views dignity as a right in itself. 
The aim of this last section is to examine, in light of a framework for the meaning and uses 
of dignity, how dignity has been judicially interpreted in the context of children's rights and 
how it may inform the debate about the question at the heart of this paper, namely whether 
297 For more recent publications see: Bioethics Council, Human Dignity and Bioethics (President Council on 
Bioethics, Washington DC 2008); D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001 ). 
298 C McCrudden, 'Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights' (2008) 19 The European 
Journal of International Law 655, 663. 
299 D Oliver, 'The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law' in M Taggart (ed) The Province of 
Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1997) 217. 
300 McCrudden, above n 298, 663. 
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the child's best interests or the child's benefit should operate as a limitation on parental 
authority to consent to a genetic test on behalf of the child. 
PART 1: HISTORICAl CONCEPTS OF DIGNITY 
There are many and overlapping meanings of dignity. In Roman thought, dignity was 
equated to status: one's status carried with it varying degrees of honour and respect.301 In 
this sense, the term evoked a person's worthiness.302 Also present during this period, but 
less prominent, was a conception of dignity as that which the human acquired by virtue of 
being human (with no additional status), in contrast with being an animal.303 Such a 
concept of dignity begged the question of the exact boundaries of the human. As one 
scholar points out "[r]adically different answers are possible, of course, and therein lies the 
root of the problem with the concept of dignity".304 Answers to these questions can be 
furnished from three sources: religion, which links the answers to the supernatural; 
philosophy which employs philosophical rigour; and history which examines the types of 
actions that have historically been considered violations of dignity.305 Religious thought 
shaped the idea of dignity as "dignity inherent in Man". Man being made in the image of 
God was "endowed with gifts" which rendered him distinct from animals.306 Giovanni 
301 D Chalmers and R lda, 'On the International Legal Aspects of Human Dignity' in J Malpas and N Lickis 
(eds), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (Spriner, Dordrecht 2007) Professor Waldron has also 
examined this notion of dignity as "status" or "rank": J Waldron, 'Dignity and Rank' (2007) 48 Archives 
Europeenes de Sociologie 201; J Waldron, 'How Law Protects Dignity' (Paper presented at the European 
University Institute, Florence 27 January 2009) . 
302 McCrudden, above n 298, 657. 
303 lbid, 657. 
304 lbid, 657 
305 lbid, 658. 
306 lbid, 659. 
93 
Pico della Mirandola's Oratio De Hominis Dignitate (Discourse on the Dignity of Man) in 
1486 emphasised the link between dignity and the capacity for choice.307 The treatise, 
composed of 900 conclusiones, disagreed with previous scholars that what set Man apart 
from other beings was a rational power or domination over animals.308 Rather, Pico 
argued that Man had dignity because He had no predetermined nature and could choose 
His desired from of existence.309 His work, considered to be the manifesto of the 
Renaissance,3 10 emphasised humans' ability to use reason, an ability divorced from office 
and hierarchy.311 Such an ability served the purpose of overcoming religious differences. 
With time, dignity's ties with religion were consciously dissolved in favour of "the central 
existential claim of modernity- man's autonomy, his capacity to be the lord of his fate and 
the shaper of his future".312 Kant relied on this conception of dignity upon which to build 
307 Pico del la Mirandola settled in Florence in 1484 at the age of 21 and wrote Oratio De Hominis Dignitate 
at the Badia Fiesolana, the current location of the European University Institute. His work is said to 
essentially define ''the aspirations and self-understanding of Renaissance humanism". A "precocious" and 
"spectacular" individual, he was a close friend of Lorenzo (The Magnificent) de' Medici. Some 13 of Pica's 
900 theses were considered heretical by the papal authorities and Pico was arrested in 1488. Lorenzo 
intervened on Pica's behalf and Pico was permitted to return to Florence. He settled in Fiesole until 
Lorenzo's death in 1492 when he moved to Ferrara. He died under suspicious circumstances in 1494 at the 
age of 31 (he is said to have been poisoned). See generally: P Strathern, The Medici: Godfathers of the 
Renaissance (Pimlico, London 2005). 
308 I Englard, 'Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Constitutional Framework' (1999-2000) 21 
Cardozo Law Review 1903, 1914. 
309 There is disagreement over the foundation and meaning of Pica's notion of dignity. Some suggest that it 
simply embodied the traditional medieval religious views, others argue that it promoted a move towards 
secular tendencies. See: 0 Boulnois, 'La Dignite de !'Image, ou I'Humanisme Est-11 Metaphysique?' in P 
Magnard (ed) La Dignite de /'Homme (Librairie Honore Champion, Paris 1995). 
310 Brown University, 'Progetto Pico I Pico Project' (2009) <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/ 
ltalian_Studies/pico/> accessed 2 September 2009. 
311 McCrudden, above n 298, 659. 
312 Y Arieli, 'On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the Dignity of Man and His 
Rights' in D Kretzmer and E Klein (eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kiuwer 
Law International, The Hague 2002) 12. 
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his own theory, a theory whose exact meaning continues to be contested.313 Kant's use of 
the term dignity is generally accepted to mean two things: that persons are ends in 
themselves and may never be treated as means to an end; and that dignity requires treating 
persons as autonomous and capable of making their own choices.314 
PART 2: USE OF DIGNITY IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
I. Core Meaning and Role 
Three useful analyses illuminate the modern meaning of dignity, how dignity is relied on 
and the role it may play. First, McCrudden proffers a minimum core of dignity comprising 
three elements: every human possesses an intrinsic worth; this intrinsic worth should be 
recognised and respected by others; and recognition of intrinsic worth requires that the 
state should exist for the sake of the individual and not vice versa.315 This minimum core 
defines the bare meaning of the term dignity itself. McCrudden argues that judicial 
discourse reveals no consensus as to the meaning of dignity beyond these parameters .316 
Second, Clapham recognises four different aspects of dignity.317 lt is submitted that these 
aspects are best understood as "manifestations" of dignity; the usual scenarios where 
313 McCrudden, above n 298, 659. 
314 I bid, 659-660; Chalmers and lda, above n 301, 160. 
315 McCrudden, above n 298, 679. 
316 1bid, 710-712. 
317 A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 
545-546. 
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dignity, howsoever defined, is perceived as important and given effect (be it in a domestic 
statute, a court case or an international i nstrument):318 
(1) the prohibition of all types of inhuman treatment, humiliation, or degradation by 
one person over another; (2) the assurance of the possibility for individual choice 
and the conditions for 'each individual's self-fulfillment', autonomy, or self-
realization; (3) the recognition that the protection of group identity and culture may 
be essential for the protection of personal dignity; (4) the creation of the necessary 
conditions for each individual to have their essential needs satisfied. 
Finally, writing primarily from a bioethics standpoint, Brownsword and Beyleveld see 
dignity as featuring in two ways within society. First, there is dignity as a virtue or 
//dignified conduct".319 This is the modern expression of equating dignity to one's status or 
rank within society. Dignified conduct as a character virtue stems from a person's attitude 
towards adversity.32° Dignity as a virtue operates in tandem with the second kind of 
dignity: human dignity as inherent worth. Dignity as inherent worth can be viewed from 
the perspective of the individual or that of the community.321 Potentially, within either 
perspective, dignity can then fulfill two roles: dignity as empowerment or dignity as 
constraint. 322 In practice dignity as empowerment tends to be individual-focussed and 
dignity as constraint community-focussed.323 Brownsword and Beyleveld explicitly favour 
318 !bid 545-546. 
319 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw above n 297, 58. 
320 lbid 59. 
321 !bid 64. 
322 R Brownsword, 'Human Dignity, Ethical Pluralism, and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnologies' in T 
Murphy (ed) New Technologies and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009); Beyleveld and 
Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw above n 297, 26; R Brownsword, 'Genomic Torts: An 
Interest in Human Dignity as the Basis for Genomic Torts' (2003) 42 Washburn Law journal413, 419-422. 
323 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw above n 297, 64. 
96 
dignity as empowerment.324 McCrudden characterises these contrasting approaches as 
dignity as an expression of individual liberty and autonomy and dignity as an expression of 
communitarian values.325 McCrudden does not perceive these two roles as informing the 
content of the meaning of dignity. Rather, they are two different ways of rationalising 
dignity's use in any given case. 
In Brownsword's view, dignity conceived as empowerment is closely linked with modern 
human rights. 326 Here, dignity is about inherent worth as a human being which 
encompasses the capacity to make choice. Accepting that respect for this type of dignity 
and capacity for choice should be recognised supports three universal claims enjoyed by 
every person: recognition of one's capacity to choose; respect for freely made choices; and 
appreciation of the need for a supportive context for autonomous-decision making.327 
Brownsword argues that human dignity as constraint '1lacks· a clear and unifying anchoring 
point".328 The so-called dignitarian alliance329 relies on this type of dignity to justify 
constraining individual rights. Dignity encompassing communitarian values can (and 
324 Brownsword, 'Human Dignity, Ethical Pluralism, and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnologies' above n 
319; Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw above n 297, 26; Brownsword, 
'Genomic Torts' above n 322,419-422. 
325 McCrudden, above n 298, 699. 
326 Brownsword, 'Human Dignity, Ethical Pluralism, and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnologies', above n 
322, 26-29. 
327 !bid 27. 
328 Brownsword, 'Genomic Torts' above n 322, 420. 
329 The dignitarian alliance claim that human dignity must not be compromised and that the duty to respect 
dignity is fundamental. If an action is deemed to be unethical by being contrary to human dignity, it will not 
stand regardless of a person's informed consent. lt is an alliance because there is more than one pathway or 
justification for this claim: Kantian, communitarian or religious: Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the 
law above n 33,31-32. 
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tends to) operate as a restraint on the right in question.330 Although it is possible for a 
concept of human dignity which focusses on what is "special about a particular 
community's idea of a civilised life and the concomitant commitment of its members" to 
support human dignity as empowerment,331 in practice this does not occur.332 
As we saw in the first section concernmg the competence to consent, Beyleveld and 
Brownsword adopt Gewirth's moral theory of agents.333 One will recall that this theory 
proposes that every agent operates within the overarching principle of equal and universal 
human rights, also called the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) (a principle of 
morality). Within this theory agents have reciprocal rights and duties to respect one 
another's freedom and well-being. Interpreting dignity as intrinsic worth and as dignified 
conduct permits the authors to draw some conclusions about the appropriateness of the 
communitarian role that dignity can play. In terms of intrinsic worth, whether or not Agent 
1\s dignity has been compromised by other agents requires consideration of whether A 
'freely' invites the compromising conduct; not whether A, according to an external 
33° In Wackenheim v France above n 44, the HRC held that a prohibition of dwarf throwing was justified on 
the basis of human dignity, the protection of which was essential for ordre public. Mr Wackenheim relied on 
human dignity as empowerment, submitting that he was choosing this employment and therefore not being 
treated as a mere thing. 
331 Brownsword, 'Human Dignity, Ethical Pluralism, and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnologies', above n 
322,30. 
332 !bid 30. The employment of dignity in this manner should be viewed with caution. Stretched to its 
logical conclusion it can support a consequential and majoritarian approach to the determination of 
individual rights- the very antithesis of human rights. 
333 The Gewirth model requires that rights be understood according to the will (or choice) theory of rights, 
potentially creating difficulties when it comes to accommodation children. See above n 37. 
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observer has lost self-respect as a result of the conduct.334 If the loss of self-respect was 
freely invited, respect for dignity requires that there be no interference in the conduct. Any 
interference would be treating the agents as mere things and breach their dignity. For 
Gewirth, agent /\s right of autonomy is fundamental. Therefore, A's own dignity (intrinsic 
worth) will not be compromised if no harm is done to the PGC-protected rights of other 
agents. In terms of dignity as "dignified conduct", if dignified conduct by A would 
indirectly promote respect for the PGC rights of other agents, then it is a virtue which other 
agents are entitled to have A cultivate.335 
At this point, we have explored the bare scope of dignity and four scenarios where dignity 
tends to arise. Creating a further layer of complexity is the two, usually conflicting, roles 
that dignity may fulfil: empowerment and constraint. The next question is how dignity is 
actually understood and used within judicial reasoning. 
11. ludicial Reliance on Dignity 
McCrudden elaborates two central judicial understandings of dignity.33 6 First, a court may 
understand dignity as providing a basis for human rights in general. This answers questions 
such as why human persons should have rights at all and what the scope of those rights 
334 D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, 'Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics' in R 
Brownsword, WR Cornish and M Llewelyn (eds), Law and Human Genetics: Regulating a Revolution (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 1998) 79. The determination of a loss of self-respect (each individual's self-esteem being 
central) is key to Kantian dignity. Loss of self-respect is relied on by the dignitarian alliance as an objective 
measure with a communitarian agenda. 
335 lbid 81. 
336 McCrudden, above n 298, 680. 
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should be.337 Within this there are "thin" and "thick" approaches. The thin approach 
perceives dignity as a way of expressing a catalogue of human rights but does not add to or 
detract from their substance. The thick (and more common) view perceives dignity as 
being a value unique to itself, distinct from the human rights which it created. Here, 
dignity is relied on as a general principle to identify those rights within the human rights 
catalogue worth protecting. On this view, dignity justifies the existence of human rights, 
can be a general principle assisting in creating and defining rights and can also be an 
interpretative principle where rights "come to be seen as best interpreted through the lens 
of dignity".338 Second, courts understand dignity as a right or an ob I igation in itself with 
specific content. Here, dignity can be either an enforceable right or a principle which 
exists behind other rights but is not of itself enforceable.339 
Regardless of a judge's understanding of dignity, s/he may in fact draw on the use of dignity 
in other foreign jurisdictions.340 Each jurisdiction affords dignity a different weight and 
status, 341 and takes a different stance on the role that dignity should play (empowerment 
versus constraint). This in turn affects the perspective adopted in a particular case 
(subjective/individual or objective/court-centred) and whether dignity can be waived.342 
337 One scholar who subscribes to the view that human dignity is the foundation of human rights law is 
Federico Lenzerini. See: F Lenzerini, 'Biotechnology, Human Dignity and the Human Genome' in F 
Francioni and T Scovazzi (eds), Biotechnology and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006) 
338 McCrudden, above n 298, 681. 
339 lbid, 681. 
340 lbid, 694. 
341 lbid, 699. 
342 lbid, 706. As to waiver, in some jurisdictions dignity is seen as fulfilling a predominantly communitarian 
function and may not be waived by the individual. 
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McCrudden submits that dignity may be more adept at resolving certain institutional 
difficulties. Dignity could be relied on to resolve "conflicts of rights, and conflicts between 
rights and other values"; to establish "how far the rights which are to be interpreted should 
be seen as instantiating international standards";343 to determine "how far the text of the 
national (or regional or international) Bill of Rights should be seen as determinative, and 
how to react when the text appears not to support a strong judicial desire to intervene".344 
Ill. The International Legal System 
Dignity is either expressly or implicitly imported into every international instrument of 
relevance to the field of human genetics and human rights. The concept of dignity has 
been hailed as "one of the most important, innovative elements introduced into 
International Law" .345 Since 1986, the UN General Assembly has provided in its 
guidelines for new human rights instruments that they should be "of fundamental character 
and derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person".346 One writer states 
that those rights which are fundamental to the protection of human dignity, of universally 
accepted values of humanity and whose violation results in condemnation from the 
international community require less confirmatory evidence than other customary rights.347 
343 Here dignity "allows each jurisdiction to develop its own practice of human rights" by enabling (and 
requiring) judges to incorporate their domestic context in the interpretation of human rights norms: lbid, 714. 
344 lbid, 714. 
345 K Dicke, 'The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' in D 
Kretzmer and E Klein (eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kiuwer Law 
International, The Hague 2002) 111. 
346 McCrudden, above n 298, 669. 
347 T Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1989) 94. 
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The founding Charter of the United Nations relies on the concept of dignity in its 
Preamble. Subsequently, the Preamble to each of the "International Bill of Rights", the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 ("UDHR"), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966,348 and the ICCPR349 refer to dignity. Dignity's 
particular prominence in the UDHR is frequently relied on to argue that human rights were 
politically and legally founded on human dignity.350 The Preamble to the Child 
Convention 351 links the expression "dignity" to that adopted in the UDHR thereby 
emphasising the child's dignity. 
In that vast area where science and human persons collide, international law has been 
particularly active. The central aim of the Oviedo Convention352 is to protect "the dignity 
and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect 
for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application 
of biology and medicine". lt is clear that "human dignity ... constitutes the essential value 
to be upheld ... [and] is at the basis of most of the values emphasised in the [Oviedo] 
Convention".353 The Genetic Testing ProtocoJ354 also provides for the protection of dignity 
and identity of all human beings.355 
348 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, opened for signature on 16 
December 1966 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
349 Above n 130. 
350 Dicke, above n 345, 111. 
351 The Child Convention above n 5. 
352 The Oviedo Convention, above n 7. 
353 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Oviedo Convention, above n 267, [9]. 
354 Genetic Testing Protocol, above n 7. 
355 Article 1 . 
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The UDHGHR356 is concerned with the protection of human dignity with regard to current 
and future research on the human genome. lt proclaims that the human genorne underlies 
the recognition of the inherent dignity of all members of the human family.357 lt reminds 
us that regardless of genetic characteristics, each person has a right to respect for their 
dignity358 and bans any practices which are contrary thereto.359 
The UDBHR360 has neither legal force nor a mechanism for enforcement. lt faced criticism 
in bioethics circles on numerous grounds, notably its reliance on problematic concepts 
such as human dignity.361 The central aim of the UDBHR was to identify those bioethical 
principles which were universally acceptable and in conformity with international human 
rights law.362 Indeed, the UDBHR "anchors the principles it endorses in the rules that 
govern respect for human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms".363 The 
UDBHR expressly recalls the Child Convention in its preamble. The three key concepts of 
'
1 human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms" are reaffirmed throughout the 
UDBHR. Their promotion is an explicit aim of the UDBHR;364 their respect is 
356 Above n 29. 
357 Article 1. 
358 Article 2. 
359 Article 11. 
360 Above n 264. 
361 R Ashcroft, 'The Troubled Relationship Between Bioethics and Human Rights' in M Freeman (ed) Law and 
Bioethics (Current Legal Issues, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 37. 
362 H ten Have, 'The Activities of UNESCO in the Area of Ethics' (2006) 16 Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal 
333,341. 
363 !bid, 341. 
364 Article 2(c). 
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commanded 365 and all advances in science and technology must be consistent with 
them.366 Moreover, human beings are recognised as equal in rights and in dignity.367 The 
UDBHR separately recognises respect for autonomy368 and respect for human vulnerability 
and personal integrity.369 
Lenzerini argues that the cumulative effect of the above provisions, (combined with the 
international legal climate in the area of biogenetics) 370 is that the dignity of the individual 
prevails "over both the general interest to research and scientific progress ... and any other 
interest of society as a whole".371 This, he submits, is consistent with the "very nature" of 
international law; respect for human dignity being the raison d 1etre of human rights law.372 
Dignity is noticeably absent in the European Convention, the first binding international 
treaty to follow the UDHR. However, the ECHR's provisions have always been consistently 
interpreted with the concept of dignity and now the Strasbourg Court regards human 
dignity as underpinning all of the European Convention rights.373 
365 Article 3. 
366 Article 2(d). 
367 Article 10. 
368 Article 5. 
369 Article 8. 
370 See e.g. United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning (Adopted by United Nations on 8 March 2005). 
371 Lenzerini, above n 337, 336. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Pretty v United Kingdom (1997) 35 EHRR 1 (ECtHR), at [65]. 
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IV. The New Zealand Legal System 
New Zealand judges do rely on the concept of dignity, but reliance is patchy and typically 
confined to certain areas. There is a dearth of case law addressing the meaning of dignity 
in any detail. Human dignity has been referred to as "a dominant theme in civilised 
life" .374 While discussing the legitimacy of the common law and its necessary 
development to reflect the ongoing and significant advances in medical knowledge and 
skills, Baragwanath J commented that:375 
... the litmus test for any law is the dignity of the individual, recognised by art. 1 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and underlying the provision of rights to 
health consumers by the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 and the 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumer Rights ... 
Leaving aside those national statutes which recognise or give effect to international 
instruments containing the term dignity,376 in New Zealand there are three broad 
categories of provisions in which dignity is mentioned.377 First, dignity operates as a 
limitation on the exercise of state power. Statutes which grant search powers generally 
provide that any search is to be carried out in accordance with the dignity of the individual 
being searched.378 Moreover, every person who is detained or arrested has the right to be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person.379 Indeed, 
374 Director of Proceedings v Nursing Council of New Zealand [1999] 3 NZLR 360 (HC). 
375 Patient A v Health Board X HC BL CIV-2003-406-14, 15 March 2005, Baragwanath j (HC) at [65]. 
376 E.g. Children Commissioner's Act 2003 where one of the purposes is to give better effect to the CRC in 
New Zealand. 
377 These closely follow the manifestations of dignity described by Clapham. See above n 317. 
378 Financial Transactions Reporting Act 1996; Corrections Act 2004; Penal Institutions Act 1954; Children 
Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989; Misuse of Drugs Act 1978. 
379 NZBORA, above n 263, s 23. 
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humane treatment is the touchstone of the meaning of dignity within s 23(5) of the 
NZBORA.380 
Second, numerous remedial provisions recognise loss of dignity, humiliation and injury to 
feelings as a head of damages.381 The positive obligation which this head of damages 
enforces is that, in certain situations, a person is to be treated with dignity and with due 
regard for his/her feelings. Treating persons with dignity in, for example, their employment 
provides the conditions necessary for self-fulfilment, autonomy and self-realisation. Third, 
there are those provisions which require that certain services are to be provided or certain 
duties are to be performed with respect for dignity.382 Dignity is often linked with 
"independence" or "autonomy". There are two specific examples relevant to the genetic 
testing of children. The HADCA (and its accompanying Code) provides that all duties are 
to be provided in a manner which respect the dignity and independence of the individual. 
Although dignity underlies the Health and Disability Commissioner Act,383 it is seldom 
relied on, except insofar ass 57(1 )(c) is concerned, which recognises that damages may be 
awarded for breaches of the Code resulting in humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to 
feelings. The other example is the Human Tissue Act 2008 which applies to the collection 
of a genetic sample. That Act ensures the collection and use of human tissue is done with 
380 Taunoa v The Attorney-General [2008] 1 NZLR 429 (SC) at [79] per Elias Cj. 
381 Employment Relations Act 2000; Human Rights Act 1993; Police Act 1958; Labour Relations Act 1987; 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 (for claims between 1984 and 1992); Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994; Privacy Act 1993. As to the latter Act, if an action results in significant humiliation, 
significant loss of dignity or significant injury to feelings, that can help make out an interference with privacy 
justifying compensation. 
382 Human Assisted Reproduction Technology Act 2004; Human Tissue Act 2008; Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994; Victims' Rights Act 2002. 
383 Patient A v Health Board X above n 375. 
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the proper recognition and respect for the autonomy and dignity of the individual whose 
tissue is collected or used. lt has yet to be relied on in New Zealand. 
There has been no case in which dignity has been substantively relied on in the context of 
any failure to provide a service towards or any failure to perform an obligation owed to a 
child.384 Moreover, no case has ever substantively explored the meaning of dignity in the 
context of children's rights, although it is accepted that every child has his or her own 
dignity, independent of his or her parents.385 The acceptance of such a fact represents a 
transformation of the "traditional" parent-child relationship from one of dependence to one 
of independence and is said to have occurred through the increased reliance on certain 
common values in the legal system, including dignity, autonomy and respect.386 Overall, 
this transformation represents a democratisation of the parent-child relationship and 
decision making.387 
384 I am excluding from this statement criminal law cases involving offences against children. To date there 
have only been three New Zealand cases which have mentioned dignity in the context of children's rights: 
AD v KT [Parenting Order] [2008] NZFLR 761 (HC); Ausage v Ausage [1998] NZFLR 72 (FC) and TV3 v R 
HC AK CRI-2005-092-14652, 7 July 2006, Winkelmann J (HC). None of these cases is relevant for present 
purposes. 
385 Ye v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 291 (CA) at [129] quoting Sachs J in the decision of M v The 
State [2007] ZACC 18 (Constitutional Court of South Africa) at [18]. The notion of the dignity of the child 
has been relied on in other immigration cases, but again, the meaning or scope of dignity is not explored: 
Ding v Minister of Immigration (2006) 25 FRNZ 568 (HC). 
386 Oliver, above n 299, 234. Although note here that Oliver understands dignity in a narrow sense to mean 
honour and reputableness: !bid 225. 
387 !bid 236. 
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And what of terms which are often associated with dignity, such as inviolability, bodily 
integrity and autonomy? In New Zealand, while the autonomy of the child is accepted,388 
no available case has explored its scope in any detail. Although autonomy was not 
employed, the High Court decision of Hawthorne v Cox recognised a presumption of a 
child's ability to make his or her own decisions upon reaching the age of 16.389 The term 
independence is sometimes relied on to express the child's independence within the family 
unit and recognition of that child as an individual distinct from other members of the 
family.390 A recognition of a child's independence or a child's decision making capacity 
are closely related to a recognition of autonomy and in turn dignity However, by not 
relying on the term dignity when resolving legal conflicts involving children, core values 
which it stands for can be lost, in particular the inherent worth of the child. 
PART 3: APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY TO THE RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
Dignity cannot be ignored. lt supplies the essence of humanity. We have seen that the 
international legal community has promulgated countless instruments which express 
dignity as a fundamental principle. Those same instruments acknowledge that that 
importance is not altered when medical and scientific advances are at play. At a domestic 
388 Usually child autonomy is considered in child abduction cases, when examining the underlying rationale 
for Article 13 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction which permits the 
abductor to raise as a defence the fact that the child objects to being returned. See for example W v N [2006] 
NZFLR 793 (HC). See also Hollins v Crozier [2000] NZFLR 775 (DC), where Doogue J at 797 noted that 
Article 12 was the linchpin of the Child Convention in its recognition of the child's personality and 
autonomy. 
389 Hawthorne, above n 62, [71]. 
390 Hinaki v Bateman [2001] NZFLR 548 (FC); F v F [FAM-2004-002-186] 24 August 2006, judge O'Dwyer 
(FC). 
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level, the legal significance of dignity is less expressly declared but its force is no less 
pervas1ve. Case law implicitly embodies it. Statute expressly endorses it. For these 
reasons, dignity must certainly feature in any analysis of the parameters of a guardian's 
consent on behalf of an incompetent child. 
How does dignity answer the overarching question within this section? In Marion5 Case391 
a divided High Court of Australia furnished two competing answers. The Court 
unanimously recognised that consent was closely connected to the right of bodily integrity 
and inviolability.392 For its part, the majority (joined by McHugh J) held that the best 
interests of the child was the key overarching limit on parental power,393 a limit which best 
protected a child's dignity for non-special procedures.394 For his part, Brennan J limited 
parental authority by reference to a therapeutic benefit best as best protecting the chi Id's 
dignity. 
Four differences have been elaborated upon in the preceding sections. Of those, three are 
particularly pertinent to the dignity of the child: that best interests imports the language of 
interests; enables the views of the child to be taken into account; and takes into account a 
broader range of factors. Indeed, these three aspects of the best interests test are what will 
enable children's rights to feature in genetic testing decision making. On Brownsword and 
Beyleveld's view, a children's rights-focussed approach to genetic testing requires that 
391 Marion's Case above n 14. 
392 lbid at [1 0] of the majority decision; at [3] of McHugh j's decision. 
393 lbid at [26]-[27] of the majority's decision. At [16] of of McHugh J's decision. 
394 As we have seen, the majority created a legal test whereby special procedures could be singled out for 
court order. 
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dignity, as far as possible, fulfil an empowerment function.395 The instability of the 
communitarian dynamic with which dignity as constraint is typically associated has been 
shown to provide too unstable a platform for the existence of human rights. Moreover 
I 
dignity as empowerment is consistent with numerous provisions in the CRC: respect for the 
evolving capacities of the child; obtaining the child's views; and recognition of a child as 
an independent person, separate from his or her family. New Zealand, as is evidenced by 
the case law, takes such an approach.396 
Admittedly, when children are involved, there are theoretical difficulties in adopting 
Gewirth's moral theory of rights. Gewirth's agents require the capacity to make free 
decisions and possess a will. In Gewirth's model, children who lack competence are at 
best proto-agents (with future capacity) as they are not yet able to make a free decision 
backed by a purpose. Yet this does not mean that the child ceases to become a human· 
entitled to dignity. The binary nature of capacity which sees a child as either not 
competent or competent can conceal this fact. A finding of incompetence or incapacity 
does not mean that the child is incapable of understanding anything, has no idea what is 
going on or is incompetent to make any decision. As Raz acknowledges, the fully 
autonomous person is a fiction. For this reason, the conclusion that the protection of the 
relevant child's dignity must be transferred to the person making the decision on their 
behalf, namely the parent, must be handled with care. This "transfer", for want of a better 
word, should not compel the exclusion of the child from the equation. There is no reason 
395 Beyleveld and Brownsword, 'Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics' above n 334; 
Brownsword, 'Human Dignity, Ethical Pluralism, and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnologies' above 
322. 
396 See Section 2, Part 4 (Ill) on New Zealand's approach to the child's views. 
why forfeiture of the ability to consent to a particular action should be accompanied by the 
surrender of further aspects of dignity: the ability to have one's views considered; the 
ability to have the surrogate decision-maker consider all factors the child, if competent, 
would take into account before making a decision directly affecting him/herself; and most 
significantly, the ability to have that same decision-maker driven by the same interest that 
would drive the decision of the child if competent, that is that child's best interests. 
Advocates of the benefit test fail to explain, from a dignitarian perspective, what it is about 
a finding of incapacity that justifies the wholesale exclusion of the child from the decision 
making process and the ignorance of factors that a competent individual in identical 
circumstances would consider relevant in making an identical decision. Such advocates 
simultaneously fail to explain why medical benefit is the sole concern of any such 
decision. An autonomous adult in the same position would pursue his/her own interests. 
Why are those interests subordinated to medical benefit when the autonomous adult is 
substituted for an incompetent child? Dignity certainly does not answer that question. To 
the contrary, it demands that those interests be considered. 
CONCLUSION 
How the genetic testing of children unable to consent should be limited is an issue which 
every society must grapple with. lt has been argued, in line with the approach taken by 
international law, that genetic information is special and to be distinguished from other 
types of medical information. The best interests of the child is the current legal regulator of 
parental decision making for children who lack capacity. However, this test has crept into 
the legal management of competent child decision making in the United Kingdom. 
Circumventing competent child decision making by applying best interests to a competent 
child or, alternatively, collapsing the best interests of the child and the child's competence 
into one enquiry, undermine a child's autonomy. This paper has argued against such an 
approach being adopted in New Zealand. Yet, ousting best interests for competent 
children would not prevent judges from ensuring that the right decision be made in the 
circumstances. Rather, it would ensure that judges undertake a detailed and transparent 
analysis of a child's competence. If a judge is satisfied that the person before them is 
competent, then they should not interfere. On the other hand, if they are not competent, 
then the best interests standard comes into play. 
lt is argued that the best interests of the child should be the overarching limitation on 
parental authority to consent to a genetic test on behalf of their non-competent child. The 
best interests fetter on parental decision making, contrary to the HGRP recommendations, 
is to be preferred over a benefit test. This is so for the following reasons. 
First, it has been shown that in international law, best interests and benefit are distinct 
concepts. Upon a closer analysis, four main differences can be described. First, best 
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interests incorporates a mechanism of optimising options. Benefit provides no such 
guidance. Second, best interests employs a language of interests. lt can be fairly stated 
that all rights are interests, although all interests are not necessarily rights. Therefore, 
interests will necessarily incorporate the rights of the child, including the child's right to 
express his or her views. This leads us to the third difference. Benefit provides no ability 
for the child's views to be taken into account and therefore differs procedurally to best 
interests. A child's right to participation is ignored. Finally, although the benefit test could 
potentially be interpreted generously,397 neither international law nor judicial practice 
supports such a broad interpretation. 
Given that a benefit test does substantively and procedurally differ from a best interests 
test, application of such a test would fail to comply with Article 3 of the CRC. This Article 
is now considered to be a general principle of interpretation in international law. 
Although the best interests standard has some flaws, this paper does not perceive them as 
fatal and has presented responses to the general criticisms mounted against it. 
Finally, the best interests test facilitates the dignity of the child to a better degree than the 
benefit test would. This is so because the benefit test fails to incorporate a language of 
interests and therefore misses an analysis of the child's autonomy, the child's views and the 
child's right not to know. All of these interests/rights require examination under a best 
interests test- benefit demands no such consideration. In this way, a benefit test does not 
afford children full protection of their dignity. This alone is reason enough to reject it. 
397 See for example Skegg's definition in the context of the s 36 incorporation of the expression "benefit" as a 
potential limitation on 16 and 17 year olds decision making: Skegg and Paterson above n 100, 171-203. This 
is discussed in Section 1, Part 3. 
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